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A reﬁnement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisﬁes two assumptions is shown
to select a subset that is stable in the sense deﬁned by Kohlberg and Mertens. One
assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strate-
gies and the other is a strong version of backward induction. Backward induction
is interpreted as the requirement that each player’s strategy is sequentially ratio-
nal and conditionally admissible at every information set in an extensive-form
game with perfect recall, implemented here by requiring that the equilibrium is
quasi-perfect. The strong version requires ‘truly’ quasi-perfect in that each strat-
egy perturbation reﬁnes the selection to a quasi-perfect equilibrium in the set. An
exact characterization of stable sets is provided for two-player games.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This article studies reﬁnements of the equilibria of a non-cooperative game. As in other
contributions to this subject, the aim is to sharpen Nash’s (1950, 1951) original deﬁni-
tion by imposing additional decision-theoretic criteria. We adopt the standard axiom of
invariance to establish a connection between games in strategic (or ‘normal’) form and
those in extensive form (with perfect recall, which we assume throughout). Our con-
tribution is to show that a set selected by a reﬁnement satisfying a strong form of the
backward-induction criterion for an extensive-form game must be stable, as deﬁned by
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) for the strategic form of the game but without their insis-
tence on a minimal stable subset.
Thus in Section 3 we deﬁne formally the two criteria called Invariance and Strong
Backward Induction, and then in Section 5 we prove:
THEOREM. If a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibria satisﬁes Invariance and Strong Back-
ward Induction then each selected subset is stable.
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The main concepts in the theorem are deﬁned in Section 3. Brieﬂy:
Invariance Invariance requires that a reﬁnement is immune to treating a mixed strat-
egyasanadditionalpurestrategy. Itsroleistoexcludesomekindsofpresentation
effects. Itschiefimplicationisthatareﬁnementdependsonlyonthereducedform
of the game, i.e. only on the strategically equivalent game obtained by deleting re-
dundant strategies from the strategic form.
Backward Induction Foragameinextensiveform, thecriterionofbackwardinduction
or ‘sequential rationality’ is usually implemented by requiring that a selected sub-
set includes a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Here the criterion
is strengthened by requiring conditional admissibility, i.e. by excluding a strategy
that is weakly dominated in the continuation from some information set. This
is implemented by requiring that the equilibrium is quasi-perfect (van Damme
1984).1 Using quasi-perfection to represent backward induction brings the ad-
vantage that the generally accepted axioms of admissibility and conditional ad-
missibility are included automatically.
Strong Backward Induction Sequential equilibrium outcomes can be sustained by
many different conditional probability systems (‘beliefs’ in Kreps and Wilson
1982), and similarly, different quasi-perfect equilibria result from considering dif-
ferent perturbations of players’ strategies. Strong Backward Induction (SBI) re-
quires that each perturbation of players’ strategies reﬁnes the selection further by
identifying a quasi-perfect equilibrium within the selected subset.
Stability A subset of the Nash equilibria is stable if each nearby game, obtained by per-
turbing each player’s strategies by a ‘tremble,’ has a nearby equilibrium. This is
the concept of stability deﬁned by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) but without their
insistence on selecting a minimal stable subset.
SBI strengthens the criterion of ‘truly perfect’ (perfect with respect to all possible
trembles) that originally motivated Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986) deﬁnition of a stable
set. In effect, SBI requires that a selected subset includes all the sequential equilibria
in admissible strategies sustained by beliefs generated by perturbations of the game.
Invariance and SBI together imply that a reﬁnement selects a subset that includes a se-
quential equilibrium for every extensive form having the same reduced strategic form
obtained by deleting redundant strategies (Section 2.3 provides an explicit example).
Due to Invariance, this implication is stronger than the property of a proper equilib-
rium of a strategic form; viz., a proper equilibrium induces a sequential equilibrium in
each extensive form with the same (non-reduced) strategic form. In general a stable
1A quasi-perfect equilibrium differs from a perfect equilibrium (Selten 1975) of the extensive form of a
game by excluding a player’s anticipation of his own trembles. We slightly modify van Damme’s deﬁnition
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subset might not contain a sequential equilibrium Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, exam-
ple in Figure 11), so the subclass of stable subsets allowed by the theorem represents a
reﬁnement of stability.
For readers who are not familiar with the early literature on reﬁnements from the
1970–80s, Section 2 reviews informally the main antecedents of this article and presents
some motivating examples. For a survey and critical examination of equilibrium reﬁne-
ments see Hillas and Kohlberg (2002). After the formulation in Section 3, stability is
characterized and the theorem is proved in Section 4 for a game with two players, which
is simpler than the general proof in Section 5. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
Appendices provide direct proofs for two cases of special interest.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The central concept in the study of non-cooperative games is the deﬁnition of equi-
librium proposed by Nash (1950, 1951). Nash interprets a player’s strategy as a ‘mixed’
strategy,i.e.arandomizationoverpurestrategies,eachofwhichisacompleteplanspec-
ifying the action to be taken in each contingency that might arise in the course of the
game. Thus a game is speciﬁed by the strategic form that assigns to the players their
utility payoffs from each proﬁle of their pure strategies, and by extension, expected pay-
offs to each proﬁle of their (mixed) strategies. Nash’s deﬁnition of an equilibrium proﬁle
of strategies requires that each player’s strategy is an optimal reply to the other players’
strategies. Although Nash’s deﬁnition can be applied to a game in the extensive form
that describes explicitly the evolution of play, it depends only on the strategic form de-
rived from the extensive form.
Selten (1965, 1975) initiated two lines of research aimed at reﬁning Nash’s deﬁni-
tion of equilibrium. The ﬁrst line invokes directly various decision-theoretic criteria
that are stronger than the criteria Nash invokes. For example, admissibility and in-
variance are relevant criteria for a game in strategic form, and subgame perfection, se-
quential rationality (as in sequential equilibria), and quasi-perfection are relevant for a
game in extensive form. The second line pursues a general method based on examin-
ing perturbations of the game. Its purpose is to obtain reﬁnements that satisfy many
decision-theoretic criteria simultaneously. For example, requiring that an equilibrium
isaffectedslightlybyperturbationsexcludesinadmissibleequilibria, i.e.thatuseweakly
dominated pure strategies. These two lines have basically the same goal although they
use different methods. That goal is to characterize equilibria that are ‘self-enforcing’
according to a higher standard than Nash’s deﬁnition requires. Perturbation methods
have been remarkably successful, but the technique is often complicated, and for appli-
cations it often sufﬁces to impose decision-theoretic criteria directly.
Both lines strengthen Nash’s deﬁnition so as to exclude equilibria that are consid-
ered implausible. For example, in the context of the strategic form one wants to exclude
an equilibrium that uses a weakly dominated pure strategy, or that depends on the ex-
istence of a pure strategy that is not an optimal reply at the equilibrium. In the context
of the extensive form, one wants to exclude an equilibrium that is ‘not credible’ because










FIGURE 1. A game with an equilibrium that is not credible if C cannot commit to her strategy
a,d.
represented explicitly in the extensive form. For instance, consider the game in Fig-
ure 1 in which player R (Row) chooses between T (top) and B (bottom) and then C (Col)
responds. The equilibrium (T;a,d) is considered not credible because it relies on C’s
threat to respond to B with d, whereas in the actual event C prefers c to d.
2.1 Reﬁnements based on speciﬁc criteria
Selten (1965) began the ﬁrst line of research. He argued that extensive-form considera-
tions enable a selection among the Nash equilibria. He proposed selecting from among
the equilibria one that induces an equilibrium in each subgame of the extensive form,
i.e. one that is subgame-perfect. Subgame-perfection requires that each player’s strat-
egy is consistent with the procedure of backward induction used in the analysis of a
decision tree with a single decision maker. Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) deﬁnition of se-
quential equilibrium extends this approach to games with imperfect information. They
require that the continuation from each contingency (a player’s information set) is op-
timal with respect to a conditional probability system (for assessing the probabilities
of prior histories) that is consistent with the structure of the game and other players’
strategies. Van Damme’s (1984) deﬁnition of quasi-perfect equilibrium imposes further
restrictions described in Section 2.2.
The main deﬁciency of these reﬁnements is that they depend sensitively on which
extensive form is used, i.e. they are plagued with presentation effects. For instance, in
Figure 2 in the top presentation there is one sequential equilibrium (r,r0;b) and others
in which R chooses `,`0. But in the bottom presentation subgame-perfection yields only
the outcome (r,r0;b) in the subgame in strategic form. Some additional criterion like
Invariance is needed to ensure that the reﬁnement does not distinguish among strate-
gically equivalent games. And even then deﬁciencies remain; e.g., a sequential equilib-
rium can use an inadmissible strategy, as in Figure 4 below.
Typical of other work in this vein is Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion for

























ℓ,r ′ 5,0 5,2 2,3
r,ℓ′ 3,2 5,2 3,0
r,r ′ 4,3 6,4 1,3
FIGURE 2. A game with multiple sequential equilibrium outcomes in the top presentation, and
only one in the bottom presentation (Hillas 1996).
cannot be some type of the sender that surely gains from deviating were the receiver to
respond with a strategy that is optimal based on a belief that assigns zero probability to
those types of the sender that cannot gain from the deviation. That is, an equilibrium
fails the Intuitive Criterion if the receiver’s belief fails to recognize that the sender’s de-
viation is a credible signal about his type. For example, in Figure 3 the sequential equi-
libria with the outcome (r,r0;b) are rejected because R would gain by choosing `0 in the
bottom contingency if C were to choose b0, which is optimal for C if she recognizes the
deviation as a credible signal that the bottom contingency has occurred—and indeed
credibility is implied by the fact that in the top contingency R cannot gain by deviating
to `.
Stability essentially implies the Intuitive Criterion and its extensions by Banks and
Sobel (1987). In particular, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Proposition 6) prove that a
stable set S contains a stable set of the game obtained by deleting strategies that are
inferior responses at all equilibria inS.
2.2 Reﬁnements based on perturbations
Selten (1975) also opened the second line of research. He proposed selecting an equi-
librium that is the limit of equilibria of perturbed games. The advantage of this com-
putational method is that it assures that various decision-theoretic criteria are satisﬁed.
Applied to the strategic form it assures admissibility, and applied to (the agent strategic

























FIGURE 3. A signaling game with two sequential equilibrium outcomes, one of which is rejected
by the Intuitive Criterion
equilibrium of the strategic form as the limit σ = lim"↓0σ" of a sequence of proﬁles of
completely mixed strategies for which σ"
n(s)¶" if the pure strategy s is an inferior reply
forplayern againstσ". Myerson(1978)deﬁnesaproperequilibriumanalogouslyexcept
that if s is inferior to s0 then σ"
n(s) ¶ "σ"
n(s0). An advantage of a proper equilibrium of
the strategic form is that it induces a quasi-perfect and hence sequential equilibrium in
every extensive form with that strategic form van Damme (1984, Theorem 1), Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986, Proposition 0).
Selten shows that an equivalent deﬁnition of a perfect equilibrium is that each
player’s strategy is an optimal reply to each proﬁle of completely mixed strategies of
other players in a sequence converging to their equilibrium proﬁle. For a game in ex-
tensive form, van Damme’s (1984) deﬁnition of a quasi-perfect equilibrium is similar:
each player uses only actions at an information set that are part of an optimal continua-
tion in reply to perturbations of other players’ strategies converging to their equilibrium
strategies. Thisensuresadmissibilityofcontinuationstrategiesineachcontingency,but
importantly, while taking account of small trembles by other players, the player ignores
hisowntremblesbothcurrentlyandalsolaterinthegame. Figure4showsvanDamme’s
example in which both (T,a;c) and (B,a;c) are sequential equilibria,2 but the second is
not quasi-perfect—as is evident from the fact that R’s strategy (T,a) weakly dominates
(B,a), which is therefore inadmissible in the strategic form. van Damme (1984) shows
that a proper equilibrium induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium, and hence a sequential
equilibrium, in every extensive form with that strategic form. A partial converse is that
a quasi-perfect equilibrium induces a perfect equilibrium of the strategic form.
Subsequent development of reﬁnements based on perturbations was inﬂuenced
greatly by the work of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) (KM hereafter). They envisioned
characterizing an ideal reﬁnement by decision-theoretic criteria adopted as axioms. To
identify what the ideal reﬁnement would be, they examined several that satisfy most of
the criteria they considered.










FIGURE 4. A game with multiple sequential equilibria but only (T,a;c) is quasi-perfect.
KM’sanalysisreliesonafundamentalmathematicalfactthatweexplainbelowusing
Figure 5. KM show that the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic
to the (one point compactiﬁcation of the) space of games obtained by varying players’
payoffs, i.e. the graph is a deformed copy of the space of games. This ‘structure theorem’
is much more speciﬁc than the usual weak characterization of the equilibrium corre-
spondence as upper-semi-continuous. The structure theorem is illustrated schemat-
ically in the ﬁgure as though the spaces of games and strategy proﬁles are each one-
dimensional. Equilibrium components of game G, shown as vertical segments of the
graph, are intrinsic to the study of reﬁnements because (a) games in extensive form are
nongenericinthespaceofgames,and(b)foranextensive-formgamewhosepayoffsare
generic in the subspace of games with the same game tree, the outcome of a sequential
equilibriumisobtainedbyallequilibriainthesamecomponent(KrepsandWilson1982,
Govindan and Wilson 2001), i.e. they agree along the equilibrium path.
KM’s basic conclusion is that a reﬁnement should select a subset of equilibria that is
‘stable’ against all perturbations of the strategic form of the game in a sufﬁciently rich
class. To avoid confusions of terminology, below we use ‘robust’ rather than ‘stable,’
or say that the subset ‘survives perturbations’ in the sense that every perturbed game
nearby has an equilibrium nearby. Their conclusion depends on several preliminary
considerations.
1. A robust subset exists. The homeomorphism implies that every game has a com-
ponent of its equilibria that survives all payoff perturbations in the sense that ev-
ery nearby game has a nearby equilibrium. In the ﬁgure, the isolated equilibria #1
and #2 and the component #4 are robust in this sense. Not shown is the further
important property that some robust subset satisﬁes Invariance, i.e. if game G is
enlarged by treating some mixed strategy as a pure strategy then the strategically
equivalent subset in the enlarged game is also robust.3
3In Govindan and Wilson (2005) we show that a component is essential (has nonzero index) if and only
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FIGURE 5. Schematic diagram of the graph of equilibria over the space of games obtained by
varying payoffs.
2. A reﬁnement should consider a sufﬁciently rich class of perturbations. In the ﬁg-
ure the component #3 of equilibria of game G has two endpoints that are each
‘perfect’ in the sense that nearby games to the right of G have nearby equilibria,
but games to the left of G have no equilibria near this component.
3. A reﬁnement should select a subset rather than a single equilibrium. In the ﬁgure
the component #4 is robust as a set, but no single point is robust—games to the
right of G have equilibria only near the top endpoint and games to the left have
equilibria only near near the bottom endpoint.
4. A reﬁnement can consider all perturbations in any sufﬁciently rich class of per-
turbations. The preceding three considerations remain true for various classes of
perturbations that are smaller than the class of all payoff perturbations. For ex-
ample, the effect of perturbations of players’ strategies by trembles (as in Selten’s
formulation) induces a (lower dimensional) subclass of payoff perturbations.
Based on these considerations, KM deﬁne three reﬁnements based on successively
smaller subclasses of perturbations of the strategic form of the game. In each case they
include the auxiliary requirements that a selected subset is closed and minimal among
thosewiththespeciﬁedproperty. Further,Invarianceisalwaysassumed,sotheproperty
must persist for every enlargement of the game obtained by treating any ﬁnite set of
mixed strategies as additional pure strategies—or equivalently, the reﬁnement depends
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• A hyperstable subset of the equilibria survives all payoff perturbations.
• A fully-stable subset survives all polyhedral perturbations of players’ strategies.
Thatis,eachneighborhoodofthesubsetcontainsanequilibriumoftheperturbed
game obtained by restricting each player to a closed convex polyhedron of com-
pletely mixed strategies, provided each of these polyhedra is sufﬁciently close (in
Hausdorff distance) to the simplex of that player’s mixed strategies.
• A stable subset survives all trembles of players’ strategies. Speciﬁcally, for every
" >0 there exists ¯ δ >0 such that for each δ ∈(0, ¯ δ)N and completely mixed proﬁle
η the perturbed game obtained by replacing each pure strategy sn of each player
n by the mixture [1−δn]sn +δnηn has an equilibrium within " of the subset.
From (1) above, some component contains a hyperstable subset, and within that
there is a fully-stable subset, which in turn contains a stable subset, since smaller sub-
sets can survive smaller classes of perturbations. A fully-stable subset is useful because
it necessarily contains a proper equilibrium of the strategic form that induces a sequen-
tial equilibrium in every extensive form with that strategic form. But a hyperstable or
fully-stable subset can include equilibria that use inadmissible strategies, which is why
KM focus on stable subsets. However, for an extensive-form game, a stable subset need
not contain a sequential equilibrium.
KM’s article ended perplexed that no one of their three reﬁnements ensures both
admissibility and backward induction. This conundrum was resolved later by Mertens
(1989, 1991) who deﬁned a stronger reﬁnement (called here Mertens-stability) that sat-
isﬁes all the criteria examined by KM, and more besides. Because Mertens-stability is
couched in the apparatus of the theory of homology developed in algebraic topology, it
is not widely accessible to non-specialists and we do not set forth its deﬁnition here.
OurpurposeinthisarticleistoshowthatKM’sstabilitycanbereﬁnedtoselectstable
subsetsthatdoindeedsatisfyadmissibilityandbackwardinduction. Asdescribedinthe
opening paragraphs of Section 1, we prove that a reﬁnement that satisﬁes Invariance
and Strong Backward Induction (SBI), deﬁned formally in Section 3, contains a stable
subset. Existence of stable subsets with these properties is assured because they are
implied by Mertens-stability.
2.3 A simple example
In this subsection an example illustrates the interaction between Invariance and SBI.
Theexampleissufﬁcientlysimplethatitsufﬁcestoignoreadmissibilityandtorepresent
backward induction by sequential equilibrium.
Figure 6 shows at the top an extensive-form game Γ in which players R and C alter-
nate moves. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium each player chooses down at his ﬁrst
opportunity, which we represent by the pure strategy D, ignoring his subsequent choice
were the player to err. With this convention the strategic form G of this game is shown
in Table 1.
There is a single component of the Nash equilibria of G, in which R uses D and C
uses any mixed strategy for which the probability of D is ¾
2














































FIGURE 6. Top: A game Γ between players R and C. Bottom: The game modiﬁed so that player R
can commit to the mixed strategy x(δ) after rejecting D.
equilibria requires further that C’s probability of a is zero. The minimal stable subset
consists of the two endpoints of the perfect-equilibrium component; viz., the subgame-









3 for D and d.
Figure 6 shows at the bottom the expansion Γ(δ) of the extensive form in which
player R can reject D and then choose either the mixed strategy x(δ)=(1−δ,δ/4,3δ/4)
orcontinuebychoosingA andthenlaterd ora ifCchoosesA. Thetwoinformationsets
of C indicate that C cannot know whether R chose x(δ). Thus, the expanded game has
imperfect information in the sense of imperfect observability of R’s choice. Even so, the
reduced strategic form of the expanded game is the same as the original strategic form
G in Table 1, since x(δ) is a redundant strategy.
Assume that 0 < δ < 1. One can easily verify that there is a unique sequential equi-
libriumintheexpandedextensiveformΓ(δ). Inthestrategicformthisistheequilibrium
in which R chooses D and C randomizes between D and d with probabilities α(δ) and
1−α(δ), where α(δ) = [8+δ]/[12−3δ]. In the extensive form this is sustained by C’s




D 1,0 1,0 1,0
d 0,2 3,0 3,0
a 0,2 0,4 0,0
TABLE 1. Strategic formG of the game Γ in Figure 6.
that he rejected D is β(δ) = 2/[2+δ]. By Bayes’ Rule, the conditional probability that R
chose x(δ) given that A occurred is p =
2
3.
A reﬁnement that includes the sequential equilibrium of each expanded extensive




component of perfect equilibria. In fact, this is precisely the Mertens-stable subset. Ap-
pendix A extends the analysis of this example to general two-player games with perfect
information.
As described in Section 2.1, reﬁnements like subgame-perfection and sequential
equilibrium that focus on the extensive form aim to exclude equilibria that are not cred-
ible because they rely on an ability to commit to a strategy that is not modeled explicitly.
In contrast, the strategic form seems to assume commitment. And seemingly worse, the
above example illustrates that a reﬁnement that satisﬁes Invariance allows a player to
commit to a redundant strategy midway in the extensive form. The resolution of this
conundrum lies in the additional assumption of backward induction. Together, Invari-
ance and backward induction imply that a selected subset must include a sequential
equilibrium of each expanded extensive form with the same reduced strategic form.
In Section 4 and Section 5 we prove in general that the conjunction of Invariance and
Strong Backward Induction implies that a selected subset must contain a stable subset
of the reduced strategic form.
3. FORMULATION
We consider games with ﬁnite sets of players and pure strategies. The strategic form of
a game is speciﬁed by a payoff functionG :
Q
n∈N Sn →RN where N is the set of players
and Sn is player n’s set of pure strategies. Interpret a pure strategy sn as a vertex of






In a gameG a pure strategy sn of player n is redundant if n has inG a mixed strategy
σn 6= sn that for every proﬁle of mixed strategies of the other players yields for every
player the same expected payoff as sn yields. The strategic form is reduced if no pure
strategy is redundant. Say that two games are equivalent if their reduced strategic forms
are the same (except for labelling of pure strategies). We use the reduced strategic form
of a game as the representative of its equivalence class. Each game in an equivalence
classisanexpansionofitsreducedstrategicformobtainedbyadjoiningredundantpure
strategies.178 Govindan and Wilson Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Say that two mixed strategies of a player in two equivalent games are equivalent if
they induce the same probability distribution (called their reduced version) on his pure
strategies in the reduced strategic form. Similarly, two proﬁles are equivalent if the play-
ers’ strategies are equivalent, and two sets of proﬁles are equivalent if they induce the
same sets of proﬁles in the reduced strategic form.
In general, a reﬁnement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a collection
of closed, nonempty subsets of its equilibria, called the selected subsets. However, each
equilibrium induces a family of equivalent equilibria for each expansion of the game
obtained by adding redundant strategies. Therefore, we assume:4
ASSUMPTION 1 (Invariance). Each selected subset is equivalent to a subset selected for
an equivalent game. Speciﬁcally, if G and ˜ G are equivalent games then a subset Σ◦ se-
lected forG is equivalent to some subset ˜ Σ◦ selected for ˜ G.
Inparticular,everyequivalentgamehasaselectedsubsetwhosereducedversionisase-
lected subset of the reduced strategic form. This is slightly weaker than requiring that a
reﬁnementdependsonlyontheequivalenceclassesofgamesandstrategies;cf.Mertens
(2003) for a detailed discussion of invariance, and more generally the concept of ordi-
nality for games.
To each game in strategic form we associate those games in extensive form with per-
fect recall that have that strategic form. Each extensive form speciﬁes a disjoint collec-
tion H = {Hn | n ∈ N} of the players’ information sets, and for each information set
h ∈ Hn it speciﬁes a set An(h) of possible actions by n at h. In its strategic form the set
of pure strategies of player n is Sn = {sn : Hn → ∪h∈HnAn(h) | sn(h) ∈ An(h)}. The pro-
jection of Sn onto h and n’s information sets that follow h is denoted Sn|h; that is, Sn|h
is the set of n’s continuation strategies from h. LetSn(h) be the set of n’s pure strategies
that choose all of n’s actions necessary to reach h ∈ Hn, and let Sn(a|h) be the subset
of strategies in Sn(h) that choose a ∈ An(h). Then a completely mixed strategy σn 





choosing a at h. More generally, a behavior strategy βn ∈
Q
h∈Hn ∆(An(h)) assigns to
each information set h a probability βn(a|h) of action a ∈ An(h) if h is reached. Kuhn
(1953)showsthatmixedandbehaviorstrategiesarepayoff-equivalentinextensive-form
games with perfect recall.
Givenagameinextensiveform,anactionperturbation" :H →(0,1)2 assignstoeach
information set a pair ("(h),"(h)) of small positive numbers, where 0 < "(h) ¶ "(h). Use
{"} to denote a sequence of action perturbations that converges to 0.
DEFINITION 1 (Quasi-Perfect). A sequence {σ"} of proﬁles is {"}-quasi-perfect5 if for
4The proof of the main theorem uses only a slightly weaker version: a selected subset is equivalent to a
superset of one selected for an expanded game obtained by adding redundant strategies.
5This deﬁnition differs from van Damme (1984) in that the upper bound "(·) of the error probability
can differ across information sets. However, it is easily shown that the set of quasi-perfect equilibria as
deﬁned by van Damme is the set of all proﬁles of behavioral strategies equivalent to limits of sequences of
{"}-quasi-perfect equilibria as deﬁned here in terms of mixed strategies. van Damme does not impose an
explicit lower bound but because the strategies are completely mixed there is an implicit lower bound thatTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Sufﬁcient conditions for stable equilibria 179




n(a|h) > "(h) only if a is an optimal action at h in reply to σ"; that is, only if
sn(h)=a for some continuation strategy sn ∈argmaxs∈Sn|h E[Gn |h,s,σ"
−n].
Suppose that σn(·|h) = lim"↓0σ"
n(·|h). Then this deﬁnition says that player n’s con-
tinuation strategy at h assigns a positive conditional probability σn(a|h) > 0 to action
a only if a is chosen by a continuation strategy that is an optimal reply to sufﬁciently
small perturbations (σ"
n0)n06=n of other players’ strategies. Thus when solving his dy-
namic programming problem, player n takes account of vanishingly small trembles by
other players but ignores his own trembles later in the game. In particular, this enforces
admissibility of continuation strategies conditional on having reached h. van Damme
(1984) shows that the pair (µ,β) = lim"↓0(µ",β") of belief and behavior proﬁles is a se-
quential equilibrium, where σ" induces at h ∈Hn the conditional probability µ"
n(t|h) of
node t ∈ h and the behavior β"
n(a|h) = σ"
n(a|h) is player n’s conditional probability of
choosing a at h.
Oursecondassumptionrequiresthateachsequenceofactionperturbationsinduces
a further selection among the proﬁles in a selected set.
ASSUMPTION 2 (Strong Backward Induction). For a game in extensive form with perfect
recall for which a reﬁnement selects a subset Σ◦ of equilibria, for each sequence {"}
of action perturbations there exists a proﬁle σ ∈ Σ◦ that is the limit of a convergent
subsequence {σ"} of {"}-quasi-perfect proﬁles.
This assumption could as well be called ‘truly’ or Strong Quasi-Perfection. As the
proofs in Sections 4 and 5 show, our main theorem remains true if Assumption 2 is
weakened by requiring action perturbations to satisfy the additional restriction that
"(h) = "(h) for all h. The reason we do not do so is conceptual. The lower bound "(·)
reﬂects the requirement that every action of a player is chosen with positive probability,
while "(·) provides the upper bound on the “error probability” of suboptimal actions at
an information set.
Weconcludethissectionbydeﬁningstability. Ingeneral,aclosedsubsetoftheequi-
libria of a game in strategic form is deemed stable if, for any neighborhood of the set,
every game obtained from a sufﬁciently small perturbation of payoffs has an equilib-
rium in the neighborhood. However, to ensure admissibility, KM focus on sets that are
stable only against those payoff perturbations induced by strategy perturbations.
For 0 ¶ δ ¶ 1, let Pδ = {(λnτn)n∈N | (∀ n) 0 ¶ λn ¶ δ,τn ∈ Σn} and let ∂Pδ be the
topological boundary of Pδ. For each η ∈ P1 and n ∈ N, let ηn =
P
s∈Sn ηn(s). Given any
η ∈ P1, a perturbed game G(η) is obtained by replacing each pure strategy sn of player
n with ηn +(1−ηn)sn. Thus G(η) is the perturbed game in which the strategy sets of
the players are restricted so that the probability that n plays a strategy s ∈ Sn must be
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at least ηn,s. For a vector (λ,τ) ∈ [0,1]N ×Σ, we sometimes write G(λ,τ) to denote the
perturbed gameG((λnτn)n∈N).
DEFINITION 2 (Stability). A closed set Σ◦ of equilibria of the gameG is stable if for each
ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for each η ∈ Pδ \∂Pδ the perturbed game G(η) has an
equilibrium within ε of Σ◦.
To avoid the trivially stable set of all equilibria, KM focus on minimal stable sets:
DEFINITION 3 (KM-Stability). AsetofequilibriaofthegameG isKM-stableifitisamin-
imal stable set.
4. TWO-PLAYER GAMES
This section provides a direct proof of the main theorem for the special case of two play-
ers. It is simpler than the proof of the general case in Section 5 because two-player
games have a linear structure. This structure enables a generalization—(iii) in the fol-
lowing theorem—of the characterization of stability obtained by Cho and Kreps (1987)
and Banks and Sobel (1987) for the special case of sender-receiver signaling games in
extensive form with generic payoffs.
THEOREM 1 (Characterization of Stability). Let G be a 2-player game, and let Σ◦ be a
closed subset of equilibria of G. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Σ◦ is a stable set of the gameG.
(ii) For each τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ there exists sequence σk in Σ converging to a point in Σ◦ and a
corresponding sequence λk in (0,1) converging to 0, such that σk is an equilibrium
of G(λkτ) for all k.
(iii) For each τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ there exists σ◦ ∈ Σ◦, a proﬁle ˜ σ ∈ Σ, and 0 < λ ¶ 1 such that,
for each player n, λσ◦
n(s)+[1−λ]˜ σn(s) is an optimal reply against both σ◦ and the
proﬁle σ∗ =λτ+[1−λ]˜ σ.
PROOF. We prove ﬁrst that (i) implies (ii). Suppose Σ◦ is a stable set. Fix τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ.
Then for each positive integer k one can choose λk ∈ (0,1/k) and an equilibrium σk
of G(λkτ) whose distance from Σ◦ is less than 1/k. Let σ◦ be the limit of a convergent
subsequence of σk. Then σ◦ ∈Σ◦, which completes the proof.
Next we prove that (ii) implies (iii). Fix τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ. (ii) assures us that there exists
a sequence λk in (0,1) converging to zero and a sequence σk of equilibria of G(λkτ)
converging to an equilibrium σ◦ in Σ◦. By passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can
assume that the set of optimal replies inG to σk is the same for all k. Deﬁne σ∗ and λ to
be the ﬁrst elements of the sequences of σk and λk. And let ˜ σ =[σ∗−λτ]/(1−λ). Then,
σ∗ = (1−λ)˜ σ+λτ. Because σ∗ is an equilibrium of G(λτ), ˜ σ is an optimal reply to σ∗.
Becausethebestrepliesareconstantalongthesequenceofσk, ˜ σ isabestreplyallalong
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of σk are equilibria of perturbed games converging to σ◦, σ◦ is optimal against σk for
large k and is therefore optimal against the entire sequence σk (in particular against σ∗
and the limit σ◦ itself). Thus, ˜ σ and σ◦ satisfy the optimality condition of (iii).
Lastly we prove that (iii) implies (i) by showing that Σ◦ satisﬁes the property in Def-
inition 2 of a stable set. Fix an ε-neighborhood of Σ◦. Take a sufﬁciently ﬁne simplicial
subdivision of Σ such that: (i) the unionU of the simplices of this complex that intersect
Σ◦ is contained in its ε-neighborhood; and (ii) the best-reply correspondence is con-
stant over the interior of each simplex. Because G is a two-player game, this simplicial
subdivision can be done such that each simplex is actually a convex polytope. Observe
that U is itself a closed neighborhood of Σ◦. LetQ be the set of all pairs (η,σ) ∈ P1 ×U
such that σ is an equilibrium ofG(η); and letQ0 be the set of (0,σ) ∈Q, namely, the set
of equilibria of the gameG that are contained inU. By property (ii) of the triangulation
andbecausethesimplicesareconvexpolytopes,Q andQ0 areﬁniteunionsofpolytopes.
TriangulateQ such thatQ0 is a subcomplex, and take a barycentric subdivision so that
Q0 becomes a full subcomplex. Because Q is a union of polytopes, both the triangula-
tionandtheprojectionmapp :Q →P1 canbemadepiecewise-linear. LetX betheunion
of simplices ofQ that intersectQ0. BecauseQ0 is a full subcomplex, the intersection of
eachsimplexofQ withQ0 isafaceofthesimplex. LetX0 =X∩Q0 andletX1 betheunion
of simplices of X that do not intersectQ0. Given x ∈ X, there exists a unique simplex K
of X that contains x in its interior. Let K 0 be the face of K that is in X0, and let K 1 be
the face of K spanned by the vertices of K that do not belong to K 0. The face K 1 is then
contained in X1. Therefore, x is expressible as a convex combination [1−α]x0 +αx1,
where xi ∈ K i for i = 0,1; moreover, this combination is unique if x 6∈ X0 ∪X1. Finally,
p(x)=[1−α]p(x0)+αp(x1)=αp(x1) because the projection map p is piecewise afﬁne.
Choose δ∗ > 0 such that for each (η,σ) ∈ X1, maxn ηn > δ∗. Such a choice is pos-
sible because X1 is a compact subset of Q that is disjoint from Q0. Fix now δ1,δ2 < δ∗
and τ ∈ Σ. The proof is complete if we show that the game G(δ1τ1,δ2τ2) has an equi-
librium in U. By (iii), there exists σ◦ ∈ Σ◦, ˜ σ ∈ Σ, and 0 < µ ¶ 1 such that σ(γ) =
((1−γδn)σ◦
n +γδn((1−µ)˜ σn +µτn))n=1,2 is an equilibrium of G(γµ(δ1τ1,δ2τ2)) for all
0 ¶ γ ¶ 1. Because σ(0) = σ◦ ∈ Σ◦, we can choose γ sufﬁciently small that the point
x = (γµ(δ1τ1,δ2τ2),σ(γ)) belongs to X \(X0 ∪X1); hence there exists a unique α ∈ (0,1)
andxi ∈Xi fori =0,1suchthatx isanα-combinationofx0 andx1. Asremarkedbefore,
p(x) = αp(x1). Therefore, there exists σ ∈ Σ such that x1 = (γ∗µ(δ1τ1,δ2τ2),σ), where
γ∗ =γ/α. Because points in X1 project to P1\Pδ∗, γ∗µδn >δ∗ for some n; that is, γ∗µ>1
since δn < δ∗ for each n by assumption. Therefore, the point [1−1/γ∗µ]x0 +[1/γ∗µ]x1
correspondstoanequilibriumofthegameG(δ1τ1,δ2τ2)thatliesinU. Thisproves(i). 
The characterization in (iii) of Theorem 1 can be stated equivalently in terms of a
lexicographic probability system (LPS) as in Blume et al. (1991a,b). As a matter of termi-
nology, given an LPS (σ0
m,...,σk
m) for player m, we say that for player n 6= m, a strategy
σn is a better reply against the LPS than another strategy σ0
n if it is a lexicographic better
reply. (Here, and throughout the paper, by a better reply we mean a strictly better reply
as opposed to a weakly better reply.) And σn is a best reply against the LPS if there is no
better reply.182 Govindan and Wilson Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
COROLLARY 1 (Lexicographic Characterization). A closed set Σ◦ of equilibria of G is a
stable set if and only if for each τ ∈ Σ \ ∂ Σ there exists σ0 ∈ Σ◦, a proﬁle ˜ σ ∈ Σ, and
for each player n, an LPS Ln =(σ0
n,...,σ
Kn
n ) where Kn >0 and σ
Kn
n =[1−λn]˜ σn +λnτn
for some λn ∈(0,1], such that for each player n every strategy that is either: (i) in the sup-
port of σk with k < Kn or (ii) in the support of ˜ σn if λn < 1, is a best reply to the LPS of
the other player.
PROOF. The necessity of the condition follows from (iii). As for sufﬁciency, we show
that the condition of the corollary implies (ii). Fix τ∈Σ\∂ Σ and let (L1,L2) be as in the
corollary. Choose an integer K that is greater than Kn for each n. For each n, deﬁne a
new LPS L 0
n =(ˆ σ0
n,..., ˆ σK
n ) as follows: for 0¶k ¶ K −Kn, ˆ σk
n =σ0








n, where µ=min(λ1,λ2). Observe that
for each n,
ˆ σK
n =µτn +[(µ(1−λn)˜ σn +(λn −µ)σ0]/λn.
Therefore, the LPS proﬁle (L 0
1,L 0














Because σ(α) converges to σ0 as α goes to zero, the condition of the corollary implies
(ii) of the theorem. 
We show in Appendix A that for generic two-person extensive form games, the re-
quirements for stability in the above lexicographic characterization can be weakened.
As mentioned before, (a version of) the characterization of stability in (iii) of Theorem 1
is obtained by Cho and Kreps (1987) and Banks and Sobel (1987) for the special case of
sender-receiver signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs—games like the
one in Figure 3. In Appendix C we show directly that if a component of the equilibria
violates this condition then a single redundant strategy can be adjoined to obtain an
equivalent game that has no proper equilibrium yielding the same outcome.
We conclude this section by proving the main theorem for two-player games.6
PROPOSITION 1 (Sufﬁciency of the Assumptions). IfareﬁnementsatisﬁesInvarianceand
Strong Backward Induction then for any two-player game a selected subset is a stable set
of the equilibria of its strategic form.
PROOF. Let G be the strategic form of a 2-player game. Suppose that Σ◦ ⊂ Σ is a set
selected by a reﬁnement that satisﬁes Invariance and Strong Backward Induction. Let
τ = (τ1,τ2) be any proﬁle in the interior of Σ. We show that Σ◦ satisﬁes the condition
of Corollary 1 for τ. Construct as follows the extensive-form game Γ with perfect re-
call that has a strategic form that is an expansion of G. In Γ each player n ﬁrst chooses
6Ananonymousrefereehasshowninhisorherreportthatfor2-playergames,inthedeﬁnitionofStrong
Backward Induction, quasi-perfection in the extensive form can be replaced by perfection in the strategic
form (we do not reproduce the referee’s proof here). This reﬂects indirectly the fact that for 2-player games
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whether or not to use the mixed strategy τn, and if not, then which pure strategy in
Sn to use. Denote the two information sets at which n makes these choices by h0
n and
h00
n. At neither of these does n have any information about the other player’s analogous
choices. In Γ the set of pure strategies for player n is S∗
n = {τn}∪Sn (after identifying
all strategies where n chooses to play τn at his ﬁrst information set h0
n) and the corre-
sponding simplex of mixed strategies is Σ∗
n. For each δ > 0 in a sequence converging
to zero, let {"} be a sequence of action perturbations that require the minimum proba-
bility of each action at h0
n to be "(h0
n) = δ and the maximum probability of suboptimal
actions at h00
n to be "(h00
n) = δ2. By Invariance, the reﬁnement selects a set ˜ Σ◦ for Γ that
is a subset of those strategies equivalent to ones in Σ◦. By Strong Backward Induction
there exists a subsequence {˜ σ"} of {"}-quasi-perfect proﬁles converging to some point
˜ σ0 ∈ ˜ Σ◦. If necessary by passing to a subsequence, by Blume et al. (1991b, Proposition 2)











n; and (ii) for each 0 ¶ k < Kn a sequence of positive numbers λk
n(")
converging to zero such that each ˜ σ"











n )). Let k∗
n be the smallest
k for which ˜ σk
n assigns positive probability to the “pure” strategy τn of the expanded
game.
LEMMA 1. Suppose sn ∈Sn is not a best reply to the LPS of the other player. Then sn ∈Sn
is assigned zero probability by ˜ σk
n for k ¶k∗
n, and k∗
n >0.
PROOF OF LEMMA. Sincesn isnotabestreplytotheLPSoftheotherplayer, sufﬁciently












n) = 0. Therefore ˜ σk
n(sn) = 0 for all k ¶ k∗
n, which
proves the ﬁrst statement of the lemma. As for the second statement, observe that the
pure strategy τn is not a best reply to the LPS of the other player, since τn, viewed as a
mixedstrategyinΣn, hasfullsupport. Therefore, faralongthesequence, τn isnotabest
replyto ˜ σ"
n. Quasi-perfectionnowrequiresthatτn isassignedtheminimumprobability
δ by the sequence and hence its probability in the limit ˜ σ0
n of the sequence ˜ σ"
n is zero,
which means that k∗
n >0. 





n ) for the
gameG by letting σk
n be the mixed strategy in Σn that is equivalent to ˜ σk
n. Because ˜ σ0 ∈




n . By the deﬁnition of k∗
n, λn > 0. If λn 6= 1, let σ0
n be the mixed strategy in Σn that
is given by the conditional distribution over Sn induced by ˜ σ
k∗
n
n , that is, the probability





n (s); if λn = 1, let σ0
n be an arbitrary
strategy in Σn. By the deﬁnition of Ln, σ
k∗
n
n = λnτn +[1−λn]σ0








the LPS proﬁle (L 0
1,L 0
2) satisﬁes the conditions of Corollary 1 for τ. Each LPS L 0
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least two levels, where the last level is λnτn +(1−λn)σ0
n, λn > 0. We now show that the
optimality property in Corollary 1 holds for each player n. If k∗
n = 0 then by Lemma 1
every strategy of player n is optimal. On the other hand, if k∗
n > 0 (and thus L 0
n = Ln)
then the ﬁrst result of Lemma 1 and the following two observations imply the optimality
property. (1) By the deﬁnition of k∗
n and Ln, for each k < k∗
n the probability of each
s ∈ Sn is the same under σk
n and ˜ σk
n; (2) if λn 6= 1 then every strategy in the support of
σ0
n is in the support of ˜ σ
k∗
n
n . Thus we have shown that Σ◦ is a stable set. 
5. N-PLAYER GAMES
ThissectionprovidestheproofofthemaintheoremforthegeneralcasewithN players.7
We begin with some deﬁnitions. For a real-valued analytic function (or more gener-
allyapowerseries) f (t)=
P∞
i=0ait i inasinglevariablet, theorderof f , denotedo(f ), is
the smallest integer i such that ai 6=0. The order of the zero function is +∞. We say that
apowerseries f ispositiveifao(f ) >0;thusif f isananalyticfunctionthen f ispositiveif
and only if f (t) is positive for all sufﬁciently small t >0. Suppose f and g are two power
series. We say that f > g if f − g is positive. We have the following relations for orders
of power series: o(f g) = o(f )+o(g); and o(f + g) ¾ min(o(f ),o(g)), with equality if f
and g are both nonnegative (or nonpositive). Suppose f and g are real-valued analytic
functions deﬁned on (−¯ t, ¯ t) where t > 0 and g 6= 0. If o(f ) ¾ o(g) then there exists an
analytic function h :(−¯ t, ¯ t)→R such that for each t 6=0, h(t)= f (t)/g(t), i.e. dividing f
by g yields an analytic function.
By a slight abuse of terminology, we call a function F :[0, ¯ t]→X, where X is a subset
of a Euclidean space RL, analytic if there exists an analytic function F0 : (−δ,δ) → RL,
δ > ¯ t, such that F0 agrees with F on [0, ¯ t]. For an analytic function F : [0, ¯ t] → Rk, the
order o(F) of F is mini o(Fi). If σ : [0, ¯ t] → Σ is an analytic function then for each pure
strategy sn of player n his payoff Gn(σ−n(t),sn) in the game G is an analytic function
as well, since payoff functions are multilinear in mixed strategies. We say that sn is a
best reply of order k for player n against an analytic function σ(t) if for all s0
n ∈ Sn,
Gn(σ−n(t),sn)−Gn(σ−n(t),s0
n) is either nonnegative or has order at least k +1; also, sn
is a best reply to σ if it is a best reply of order ∞.
LEMMA 2. Suppose σ, τ : [0, ¯ t] → Σ are two analytic functions such that o(σ−τ) > k. If
sn is not a best reply of order k against σ then it is not a best reply of order k against τ.
PROOF. Let s0
n be a pure strategy such that Gn(σ−n(t),sn)−Gn(σ−n(t),s0
n) is negative
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The ﬁrst term on the right in the above expression is negative and has order ` by as-
sumption. Therefore,toprovetheresultitisenoughtoshowthattheorderofthedouble
summation is at least k +1: it then follows that the whole expression is negative and has
order `. To prove this last statement, using the above property of the order of sums of
power series, it is sufﬁcient to show that each of the summands in the second term has
order at least k +1. Consider now a summand for a ﬁxed s−n and N0 ( N \{n}. If both
sn and s0
n give the same payoff against s−n then the order of this term is ∞. Otherwise,








where the inequality follows from the following two facts: (i) the order of each σn0,sn0 is
at least zero; and (ii) there exists at least one n00 / ∈ (N0 ∪ {n}) and for any such n00 the
order of τ0
n00,sn00 is greater than k by assumption. 
We use the following version of a result of Blume et al. (1991b, Proposition 2).
LEMMA 3. If the map τn : [0, ¯ t] → Σn is analytic then there exists 0 < t∗ ¶ ¯ t such that




n, where K ¶ |Sn|, each τk
n is in Σn, and each map
f k
n :[0,t∗]→R+ is analytic.
PROOF. There is nothing to prove if τn is a constant map. Therefore, assume that it is
not. Let τ0
n = τn(0) and let S0
n be the support of τ0




n,s. Remark that if for some t, τn(t) 6= τ0
n, then f 0
n(t) < 1; in-
deed, if f 0
n(t) ¾ 1 then for each pure strategy s (even if it is not in S0
n) τn,s(t) ¾ τ0
n,s and
therefore τn(t) = τ0
n. Since τn(t) is analytic, there now exist 0 < t0 ¶ ¯ t and s0 ∈ S0
n
such that for all t ¶ t0, f 0
n(t) = τn,s0(t)/τn,s0, i.e. f 0
n is analytic on [0,t0]. Moreover,
since τn(t) is not a constant function and since τn,s0(0) > 0, t0 can be chosen such
that for all 0 < t ¶ t0: (i) τn(t) 6= τ0
n; and (ii) τn,s0(t) > 0. Therefore, for 0 < t ¶ t0,
0 < f 0
n(t) < 1, where the fact that it is positive follows from the fact that τn,s0(t) is pos-
itive while the other inequality follows from our earlier remark, since τn(t) 6= τ0
n. We
claim now that there is a well deﬁned analytic function τ1
n : [0,t0] → Σn where for t 6= 0,
τ1
n(t) = [1− f 0
n(t)]−1[τn(t)− f 0
n(t)τ0
n]. Indeed to prove this claim it is sufﬁcient to show
that: (i) 1− f 0
n(t) is positive; and (ii) for each s ∈ Sn, τn,s(t)− f 0
n(t)τ0
n,s is nonnegative
with o(τn,s(t)− f 0
n(t)τ0
n,s) ¾ o(1− f 0
n(t)). Point (i) follows from the fact that f 0
n(t) < 1.
As for point (ii), for s / ∈ S0
n, τn,s(t) − f 0
n(t)τ0






n,s = 0. Thus τn,s(t)− f 0
n(t)τ0
n,s is nonnegative for












well-deﬁned analytic function. We now have that τn(t) = f 0
n(t)τ0
n +[1− f 0
n(t)]τ1
n(t) for
eacht ¶t0. For0<t ¶t0,thesupportofτ1
n(t)iscontainedinthatofτn(t),since fn(t)<
1; also, τ1
n,s0(t) is zero, while τn,s0(t) is obviously not. Thus, suppτ1
n(t) ( suppτn(t) for
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If τ1
n(t) is a constant function mapping to, say, τ1
n ∈ Σn, let f 1
n(t) = (1 − f 0
n(t))
and then τn(t) = f 0
n(t)τ0
n + f 1
n(t)τ1
n and we are done. So, assume that τ1
n(t) is not a




n. We can repeat the above
construction for the function τ1
n(t) to obtain the following. There exists 0 < t1 ¶ t0,
s1
n ∈ S1
n, analytic functions ˆ f 1
n(t) : [0,t1] → R and τ2
n(t) : [0,t1] → Σn such that for






n,s1; 0 < ˆ f 1
n(t) < 1; τ2
n(t) =
[1− ˆ f 1
n(t)]−1[τ1




n(t). On the other hand,
as before, f 1
n(t) = τ1
n,s1(t)/τ1
n,s1 and thus τ2
n,s(t) = 0 while τ1
n,s1(t) is not: in particular
suppτ2
n(t) ( suppτ1





n + f 2
n(t)τ2
n(t) where f 1
n(t)=[1− f 0
n(t)] ˆ f 1
n(t) and f 2
n(t)=[1− f 0
n(t)][1− ˆ f 1
n(t)]. We
can continue this process to obtain a sequence of analytic functions τk
n : [0,tk] → Σn,
k = 0,1,..., with 0 < tk ¶ tk−1, τk
n ≡ τk
n(0), and a corresponding sequence of ana-
lytic functions f k








n + f k
n τk
n(t). This pro-
cess must terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, in the sense that there exists K ¶ |Sn|
such that τK
n (t) is a constant function. 
MAIN THEOREM. IfareﬁnementsatisﬁesInvarianceandStrongBackwardInductionthen
for any game a selected subset is a stable set of the equilibria of its strategic form.
PROOF. We show that if a reﬁnement selects a subset Σ◦ ⊂ Σ of proﬁles that is not a
stable set for the strategic-form game G then it satisﬁes Invariance only if it violates
Strong Backward Induction.
Suppose Σ◦ is not a stable set. Then there exists ε > 0 such that for each δ ∈ (0,1)
thereexistsη∈Pδ\∂Pδ suchthattheperturbedgameG(η)doesnothaveanequilibrium
in the ε-neighborhoodU of Σ◦. Take a closed semi-algebraic neighborhood X of Σ◦ that
is contained in U. Let A = {(λ,τ) ∈ (0,1)
N ×(Σ\∂ Σ) | G(λ,τ) has no equilibrium in X};
thenA isnonemptyandthereexistsτ◦ ∈Σsuchthat(0,τ◦)isintheclosureofA. Further,
becauseX issemi-algebraic,A tooissemi-algebraic. Therefore,bytheNashCurveSelec-
tion Lemma (cf. Bochnak et al. 1998, Proposition 8.1.13) there exists ¯ t >0 and a semial-
gebraicanalyticmapt 7→(λ(t),τ(t))from[0, ¯ t]to[0,1]N×Σsuchthat(λ(0),τ(0))=(0,τ◦)
and (λ(t),τ(t))∈A for all t ∈(0, ¯ t]. Deﬁne the compact semi-algebraic set
Y ={(t,σ)∈[0, ¯ t]×X |(∀ sn ∈Sn) σn,sn ¾λn(t)τn,sn(t)}.
Observe that if (t,σ)∈Y with t 6=0 then σ is not an equilibrium ofG(λ(t),τ(t)).
LEMMA 4. There exists a positive integer p such that for every analytic function z 7→
(t(z),σ(z)) from an interval [0, ¯ z] to Y, where t(z) is a positive function, there exists a
player n and a pure strategy sn ∈Sn such that σ(z) > λn(t(z))τn,sn(t(z)) and sn is not a
best reply of order o(t(z))p against σ(z).
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and β(t,σ) = t. By construction, α, β ¾ 0 and α−1(0) ⊆ β−1(0). By Lojasiewicz’s in-
equality (Bochnak et al. 1998, Corollary 2.6.7) there exist a positive scalar c and a pos-
itive integer p such that cα ¾ βp. Given an analytic map z 7→ (t(z),σ(z)) as in the
statement of the lemma, observe for each n,sn,s0
n, that σn,sn(z)−λ(t(z))τn,sn(t(z)) and
Gn(s0
n,σ−n(z))−Gn(sn,σ−n(z)) are also analytic in z. Therefore there exists a pair n,sn







where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that σn,sn(z) − λn(t(z))τn,sn(t(z)) ¶ 1.
By assumption, t(z) is positive. Therefore, maxn,sn,s0
n[Gn(s0
n,σ−n(z))−Gn(sn,σ−n(z))] is
also a positive analytic function and, being greater than c−1(t(z))
p, has order at most
o(t(z))p. 




n, where each τk
n is a
mixed strategy in Σn and f k
n : [0, ¯ t] → R+ is analytic. Construct the game Γ in extensive
forminwhicheachplayern choosesamongthefollowing, whileremaininguninformed
of the others’ choices. Player n ﬁrst chooses whether to commit to the mixed strategy
τ0
n or not; if not then n chooses between τ1
n or not, and so on for k = 2,...,Kn; and if
n does not commit to any strategy τk
n then n chooses among the pure strategies in Sn.
Let ˜ S and ˜ Σ be the sets of pure and mixed-strategy proﬁles in Γ. (As in the two-person
case, for each player n and each 0 ¶ k ¶ Kn we identify all strategies of n that choose,
at the relevant information set, to play the strategy τk
n.) Because the strategic form of
Γ is an expansion of G, Invariance implies that for the game Γ the reﬁnement selects a
subset of those strategies equivalent to Σ◦. We now show that the reﬁnement does not
satisfy Strong Backwards Induction in the game Γ. The argument is by contradiction.
Suppose it does satisfy SBI. For perturbations of the game Γ use the following action
perturbation: for the information set where n chooses between τk




n(t) = λn(t)f k





n (t)=t p+1, where p is as in Lemma 4.
Let E bethesetof(t,σ)∈(0, ¯ t]× ˜ Σsuchthatσ isan{"(t)}-quasi-perfectequilibrium
of Γ (i.e. satisfying conditions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 2.2) whose reduced-form strategy
proﬁle in Σ lies in X. Because the minimum error probabilities are analytic functions of
t, E is a semi-analytic set.8 Strong Backward Induction requires that there exists ˜ σ0 ∈Σ∗
such that the reduced form of ˜ σ0 belongs to Σ0 and (0, ˜ σ0) belongs to the closure of
E. By the Curve Selection Lemma (cf. Lojasiewicz 1993, II.3) there exists an analytic
function z 7→(t(z), ˜ σ(z)) from [0, ¯ z] to [0, ¯ t]× ˜ Σ such that (t(z), ˜ σ(z))∈ E for all z >0 and
(t(0), ˜ σ(0))=(0, ˜ σ0). By construction, 0<o(t(z))<∞.
From ˜ σ(z) construct the analytic function ˆ σ(z) as follows: for each player n, choose
a strategy s∗
n in Γ such that o(˜ σn,s∗
n) is zero; that is, a strategy in the support of ˜ σn(0).
LetS0
n be the set of all pure strategies sn of the original gameG that are chosen with the
8A ⊆ Rk is semi-analytic if for all x ∈ Rk there exists a neighborhood U of x such that A ∩U is a ﬁnite
union of sets of the form {y ∈U | f1(y) = ··· = fm(y) = 0,g1(y) > 0,...,gn(y) > 0} where f1,... fm, g1,...,gn
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minimumprobabilityin ˜ σ(t)(thatis,withprobability(t(z))
p+1); let ˆ σn,sn(z)=0foreach
sn ∈S0
n; deﬁne ˆ σn,s∗
n(z) = ˜ σn,s∗
n(z)+|S0
n|(t(z))
p+1; and ﬁnally, let the probabilities of the
other strategies in ˆ σ be the same as in ˜ σ. Obviously, o(˜ σ(z)− ˆ σ(z)) ¾ o(t(z))(p +1) >
o(t(z))p, where the second inequality follows from the fact that 0<o(t(z))<∞.
If ˆ σn,sn(z)>0forsomesn ∈Sn thensn isabestreplyagainst ˜ σ(z);hencebyLemma2
sn is a best reply of ordero(t(z))p against ˆ σ(z). Likewise, for each k the strategy sn that
plays τk
n at the appropriate information set is optimal of ordero(t(z))p against ˆ σn(z) if
ˆ σn,sn(z)>λn(t(z))f k
n (t(z)).
Let σ(z) be the reduced form of ˆ σ(z) in the gameG. Because ˆ σ(0) = ˜ σ(0), there ex-
ists z∗ > 0 such that σ(z) ∈ X for all z ¶ z∗. We claim now that we have a well-deﬁned
analytic function ϕ : [0,z∗] → Y given by ϕ(z) = (t(z),σ(z)): indeed, t and σ are ana-
lytic functions and, as we remarked, σ(z) is contained in X; also, for each n and sn ∈Sn,
σn,sn(z)¾λn(t(z))τn,sn(t(z)),sincein ˜ σ(z)(andthereforein ˆ σ(z))the“pure”strategyτk
n
is chosen with probability at least λn(t(z))f k
n (t(z)). Therefore, ϕ is a well-deﬁned map,
and by Lemma 4, there exist n, sn such that σn(z) assigns sn more than the minimum
probability even though it is not a best reply of ordero(t(z))p against σn(z) (and ˆ σ(z)).
By the deﬁnition of σ(z) and ˆ σ(z), either (i) sn is assigned a positive probability by ˆ σ(z)
or (ii) a strategy τk
n (containing sn in its support, when viewed as a mixed strategy in Σn)
is assigned a probability greater than λn(τ(z))f k
n (t(z)), even though it is not a best reply
of order o(t(z))p against ˆ σ(z), which contradicts the conclusion of the previous para-
graph. In the game Γ, therefore, for any sequence of sufﬁciently small t there cannot be
a sequence of {"(t)}-quasi-perfect proﬁles whose reduced forms are in X. Thus Strong
Backward Induction is violated. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The contribution of the Main Theorem is the demonstration that a ‘truly perfect’ form
of backward induction, namely Strong Backward Induction, in an extensive-form game
implies stability in the strategic form, provided one links the two forms by requiring
Invariance.
We accept the arguments for Invariance and admissibility adduced by Kohlberg and
Mertens as entirely convincing—to do otherwise would reject a cornerstone of decision
theory. Our assumptions differ primarily in using quasi-perfection to specify a form of
backward induction that ensures admissibility. Our result differs in that we obtain a
reﬁnement in which a stable set must include a quasi-perfect and hence a sequential
equilibrium of every extensive form with the same reduced strategic form.9
In spite of its awkward name, quasi-perfection seems to be an appropriate reﬁne-
ment of weaker forms of backward induction such as sequential equilibrium. Some
9Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Appendix D) establish a comparable result in the special case of an iso-
lated equilibrium that assigns positive probability to every optimal strategy, and that is perfect with respect
to every perturbation of behavior strategies in every extensive form with the same reduced strategic form.
But such an ‘essential’ equilibrium need not exist; indeed, this seems to be the original motivation for their
deﬁnition of stable sets of equilibria. In Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Appendix E) they argue that im-
plementing backward induction by sequential equilibrium cannot sufﬁce to imply stability. They cite van
Damme’s (1984) work on quasi-perfection but unfortunately they do not consider whether it is an appro-
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strengthening is evidently necessary since a sequential equilibrium can use inadmis-
sible strategies and strategies that are dominated in the continuation from an informa-
tion set. Strong Backward Induction is used in the proofs mainly to establish existence
of lexicographic probability systems that ‘respect preferences’ as deﬁned by Blume et al.
(1991b). Thus Assumption 2 might state directly that each sequence of perturbations
of an extensive form should reﬁne the selected set by selecting a lexicographic equilib-
riumthatrespectspreferences,analogouslyto(iii)ofTheorem1andCorollary1fortwo-
player games. It seems plausible that quasi-perfection can be characterized in terms of
a lexicographic equilibrium with the requisite properties.
APPENDIX
A. GENERIC TWO-PERSON EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES
This appendix proves the analog of Corollary 1 for generic extensive-form games.
We consider a ﬁxed ﬁnite game tree with perfect recall and two players having the
setsSn andΣn ofpureandmixedstrategiesforeachplayern ∈N ={1,2},andthespaces
S =
Q
nSn and Σ =
Q
n Σn of pure and mixed strategy proﬁles. Given this game tree, let
G be the Euclidean space of players’ payoffs in extensive-form games with this tree.
Deﬁne E to be the following subset of the graph of the perturbed equilibrium corre-
spondence over the space of games: E is the set of those (G,λ,τ,σ) ∈ G ×[0,1]×Σ×Σ
such that (a) σ is an equilibrium of G(λτ) and (b) if λ = 0 then there exists a sequence
λk ∈ (0,1) converging to zero and a sequence σk of equilibria of G(λkτ) converging σ.
Denote by p the natural projection from E to G.
LEMMA 5. For each gameG, p−1(G) is compact.
PROOF. Fix a game G ∈ G. Let Q be the set of those (η,σ) ∈ P1 ×Σ such that σ is an
equilibrium of G(η). And, let Q0 be the subset of (0,σ) ∈Q. Because G is a two-player
game,Q andQ0 are unions of polytopes. TriangulateQ such thatQ0 is a full subcomplex
and each simplex ofQ is convex. Let X be the union of the simplices ofQ that intersect
Q0 but are not contained in Q0. Because Q0 is a full subcomplex of Q, the intersection
of each simplex of X withQ0 is a proper face of the simplex. Let X0 = X ∩Q0 and let X1
be the union of simplices of X that do not intersectQ0. Given a point x ∈X, let K be the
simplex that contains x in its interior. Then K ∩Xi is a nonempty face of K for i = 0,1
and every vertex of K belongs to either X0 or X1. Therefore, x is expressible as a convex
combination α(x)x1 +[1−α(x)]x0, where xi ∈ K ∩Xi for i =0,1.
We are now ready to prove the lemma. Obviously it is sufﬁcient to prove that p−1(G)
is closed. Accordingly, consider a sequence (G,λk,τk,σk) in E converging to a point
(G,λ,τ,σ). We show that (G,λ,τ,σ) belongs to E. The result is clear if λ 6= 0. Therefore,
assume that λ = 0. By the deﬁnition of E, we can assume without loss of generality that
λk ∈(0,1) for all k.
Because λk > 0, (ηk,σk) ∈ Q \Q0, where ηk = λkτk. If necessary by passing to
a subsequence, we can assume that the entire sequence (ηk,σk) is contained in the
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therefore, K iscontainedinX. Foreachk thereexists(0,σ0k)∈X0∩K,(η1k,σ1k)∈X1∩K
andanumberαk >0suchthat(ηk,σk)=[1−αk](0,σ0k)+αk(η1k,σ1k). Clearly,foreach
k, η1k =µkτk, whereµk =λk/αk. SinceX1∩K iscompact, bypassingtoanappropriate
subsequence, we can assume that (η1k,σ1k) converges to some (η1,σ1)∈X1∩K, where
obviously η1 6= 0. Because η1k = µkτk, and τk converges to τ, this implies that µk
converges to some µ6=0 and η1 =µτ.
As (0,σ) and (η1,σ1) belong to K, so does (νη1,νσ1 +(1−ν)σ) for all ν ∈ [0,1]. For
all ν ∈ (0,1] now, (G,νµ,τ,νσ1 + (1 − ν)σ) belongs to E, which shows that (G,0,τ,σ)
belongs to E. 
Deﬁne E◦(G) = {(τ,σ) | (G,0,τ,σ) ∈ E}. By (ii) of Theorem 1, a closed set Σ◦ of equi-
libria of G is a stable subset if and only if for each τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ there exists σ ∈ Σ◦ such
that (τ,σ) ∈ E◦(G). We invoke a slightly weaker concept of stability that turns out to be
equivalent to stability for generic games in G.
ForG ∈G, deﬁne
˜ E◦(G)={(τ,σ)|∃(Gk,λk,τ,σk)→(G,0,τ,σ) s.t. ∀k, λk >0,(Gk,λk,τ,σk)∈E}.
Call a closed set Σ◦ of equilibria of G a pseudo-stable set of G if (∀τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ)(∃ σ ∈ Σ◦)
such that (τ,σ)∈ ˜ E◦(G). Since E◦(G)⊆ ˜ E◦(G), if Σ◦ isa stable setthen itis apseudo-stable
set as well. The following proposition shows that for generic games the two concepts
coincide.
PROPOSITION 2. There exists a closed lower-dimensional semialgebraic subset G † of G
such that for eachG ∈G \G † every pseudo-stable set of G is a stable set.
PROOF. As in Blume and Zame (1994, §2 Lemma) one applies the Generic Local Trivial-
ityTheoremtotheprojectionmapp fromE toG toestablishexistenceofaclosedlower-
dimensional subset G † ⊂G such that for each connected component G i of G \G † there
exists a semi-algebraic ﬁberCi and a homeomorphism hi :G i ×Ci →p−1(G i) such that
[p ◦hi](G,c) =G for all (G,c) ∈ G i ×Ci. By Lemma 5, p−1 is compact valued and thus
Ci is compact.
To prove the proposition it is sufﬁcient to show that for each G ∈ G \ G †, E◦(G) ⊇
˜ E◦(G). LetG belong to a component G i of G \G †. Pick (τ,σ)∈ ˜ E◦(G). We now show that
(G,0,τ,σ) ∈ E. Since (τ,σ) ∈ ˜ E◦(G), by deﬁnition, there exists a convergent sequence
(Gk,λk,τ,σk) → (G,0,τ,σ) with each (Gk,λk,τ,σk) in E. Because G i is a component
of the open set G \G †, the sequence (Gk,λk,τ,σk) is eventually in p−1(G i). Therefore,
for large k there exists ck in Ci such that hi(Gk,ck) = (Gk,λk,τ,σk). Because Ci is
compact, there exists c ∈Ci that is a limit of a convergent subsequence of ck. Obviously
(G,0,τ,σ) is the image of (G,c) under hi and is therefore in E. 
We now prove the analog of Corollary 1.
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(*) for each τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ there exists an equilibrium σ0 in Σ◦, a proﬁle ˜ σ ∈ Σ,




where Kn >0 and σ
Kn
n =[1−λn]˜ σn +λnτn for some λn ∈(0,1], such that for
each strategy s ∈Sn with
PKn−1
k=0 σk
n(s)+[1−λn]˜ σn(s)>0 and each informa-
tion set h of n that s does not exclude, s is a conditionally optimal reply at h
for player n against σ
k(h)
m , where m 6= n and k(h) is the ﬁrst k ∈ {0,...,Km }
such that h is reached with positive probability when n plays s and m plays
σk
m.
PROOF. The necessity follows by applying (iii) of Theorem 1. To prove sufﬁciency we
invoke Proposition 2: it is sufﬁcient to show that Σ◦ is a pseudo-stable set and thus to
show that for each τ ∈ Σ \ ∂ Σ there exists σ ∈ Σ◦ with (τ,σ) ∈ ˜ E◦(G). Fix τ ∈ Σ \ ∂ Σ.
Let (L1,L2) be an LPS proﬁle as in the statement of the theorem. The proof uses the
construction and notation from the (sufﬁciency) proof of Corollary 1. As there, obtain
for each player n, the LPS L 0
n =(ˆ σ0
n,..., ˆ σK
n ). For each n,
ˆ σK
n =µτn +[(µ(1−λn)˜ σn +(λn −µ)σ0]/λn
and is thus expressible as an average µτn +(1−µ)¯ σn, where ¯ σn is a convex combina-
tion of ˜ σn and σ◦
n that equals σ◦
n when λn = 1 and µ < 1. The proﬁle (L 0
1,L 0
2) satisﬁes
the optimality property in (*). Speciﬁcally, for each player n, each strategy s that is in
the support of ˆ σk
n for k < K or in the support of ¯ σn when µ < 1 is optimal against L 0
m
in the following sense: at each information set h that s does not exclude, s is condi-
tionally optimal against ˆ σ
k(h)
m , where k(h) is the ﬁrst level of L 0
m that does not exclude
h. Deﬁne σn(α) as in the proof of Corollary 1. The optimality property for (L 0
1,L 0
2)
implies that for each sufﬁciently small α there exists a perturbed game G(α) such that:
(a) G = limα↓0G(α); and (b) each strategy in the support of any σk with k < K, or in
the support of ¯ σ if µ < 1, is an optimal reply to σ(α) in the game G(α).10 Therefore,




αKµ. Thus, (τ,σ0) is in ˜ E◦(G) as
claimed. 
B. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
This appendix generalizes the analysis of the example in Section 2.3 using the formu-
lation in Section 3. We consider an extensive-form game Γ with perfect information
and, for simplicity, generic payoffs and two players. As mentioned in Section 2.2, a
proper equilibrium induces a quasi-perfect and hence sequential equilibrium in every
extensive-form game with that strategic form. Therefore, in this section we represent
Strong Backward Induction simply by the assumption that a selected subset contains a
proper equilibrium of the strategic form. Together with Invariance, this implies that a
subset Σ◦ is selected for the strategic formG of Γ only if, for every gameG0 equivalent to
G, there exists a proper equilibrium of G0 that is equivalent to some equilibrium in Σ◦.
10The proof of this fact follows the construction in the appendix of Kreps and Wilson (1982) by working
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To show that this property implies that a selected subset is stable, for each strategy per-
turbation η of G we consider an equivalent game G0 obtained by adjoining redundant
strategic-form strategies that induce redundant behavioral strategies in the extensive
form Γ.
The interesting aspect of the following Proposition 3 is that, even though the proper
equilibrium is merely the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extensive-form
game Γ, Invariance requires a reﬁnement to select a subset that includes other equi-
libria in a stable set in the same component as the subgame-perfect equilibrium. This
illustrates vividly that even for perfect-information games, which are usually consid-
eredtrivialandeasilysolvedbyapplyingsubgame-perfection,ifoneassumesInvariance
then the selected subset must survive all trembles of the players’ strategies.
Let Γ ∈ G \G † be a two-person perfect-information game with generic payoffs, and
denote by G its strategic form. (The sets G and G † are as in Appendix A and we fur-
ther assume that Γ has ﬁnitely many equilibrium outcomes, which is also a property of
generic extensive-form games.) Because Γ is a perfect-information game, each node x
of the game tree of Γ deﬁnes a subgame Γ(x) that has x as its root. When referring to
player n, we use m to denote his opponent. We say that a strategy σn ∈ Σn enables (or,
alternatively, does not exclude) a node x in the game Γ if there exists σm ∈ Σm such that
x isreachedwithpositiveprobabilityundertheproﬁle(σn,σm). Ifastrategyσn enables
a nodex then it induces a continuation strategy in the subgame Γ(x) in the obvious way.
Let Σ◦ be a closed set of equilibria, all of which induce the same probability distri-
bution P◦ over outcomes. For a node x in the extensive form of Γ, P◦(x) denotes the
probability of reaching x under the distribution P◦. Because Γ is a generic game with
perfect information, for each x such that P◦(x)>0 and x is a node of one of the players,
all equilibria in Σ◦ enable x and prescribe the same (pure) action there.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose a reﬁnement satisﬁes Invariance and selects only subsets con-
taining proper equilibria. If this reﬁnement selects Σ◦ in the gameG then Σ◦ is a stable set
of G.
The basic idea of the proof is to obtain the LPS induced by a proper equilibrium of
an expanded game, and then truncate the LPS to obtain one that satisﬁes condition (*)
in Theorem 2. Unlike the example in Section 2.3, here we add two types of redundant
strategies to cover all possibilities in the general case. First we establish notation and
then, since the proof is long, we break it into a series of claims.
Fix τ ∈ Σ\∂ Σ. We show that Σ◦ satisﬁes the condition (*) for the proﬁle τ in The-
orem 2. Denote by b the behavioral strategy proﬁle that is equivalent to τ. Since τ is
completely mixed, every node of Γ is reached with positive probability under b.
For each player n, let Xn be the set of nodes where he moves.
• Let Vn ⊂ Xn comprise those nodes x for which P◦(x) = 0 and the last node y pre-
ceding x such that P◦(y)>0 belongs to player m.
Each node x ∈ Vn is excluded by player m’s equilibrium action at an earlier node
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Let Wn = Xn \Vn and let W 0
n be the set of x ∈ Xn such that P◦(x) > 0. Obviously,
W 0
n ⊆Wn.
• LetQn ⊆Sn be the set of pure strategies s of player n such that for each x ∈ W 0
n , s
plays the unique action associated with Σ◦ at x.
Let Rn =Sn \Qn.
The setQn is nonempty, while Rn is nonempty if and only if there exists a node in
W 0
n where player n has at least two actions available.
The following claim follows readily from our deﬁnitions.
CLAIM 1. Suppose x / ∈W 0
n .
(1) If x belongs to Vn then every node y that belongs to Xm (resp. Xn) and that precedes
orsucceedsx belongstoWm (resp.Vn∪W 0
n ). Moreover,x isenabledonlybystrategies
in Rm and it is enabled by some strategy inQn.
(2) If x belongs to Wn then any node y in Xm (resp. Xn) and that precedes or succeeds x
belongs to Vm ∪W 0
m (resp. Wn). Moreover, x is enabled by some strategy inQm and
is enabled only by strategies in Rn.
The support of every equilibrium in Σ◦ is contained in Qm ×Qn. Also, for each n,
every strategy inQn is a best reply against every equilibrium in Σ◦, since the strategies
inQn differ only at nodes that are in Vn (which are excluded by the equilibria in Σ◦, by
point (1) of Claim 1) or in Wn \W 0
n (which are excluded by all strategies inQn by point
(2) of Claim 1).
For each player n, ﬁx some pure strategy ¯ sn ∈Qn.
• Let ¯ qn be a mixed strategy equivalent to the following behavioral strategy: at each
node x ∈ Vn player n plays according to bn, and at each node x ∈ Wn player n
plays according to ¯ sn. Obviously, ¯ qn is a mixture over strategies inQn.11
• In case Rn is nonempty, let ¯ rn be a mixed strategy equivalent to the following be-
havioral strategy: at each node x ∈ Vn player n plays according to ¯ sn, and at each
node x ∈ Wn player n plays according to bn. Then ¯ rn is a mixture over strategies
in Rn andQn that assigns a positive probability to some strategy in Rn.
The following claim also follows readily from Claim 1 and from our deﬁnitions.
CLAIM 2. The mixed strategy ¯ rn enables each node in Vm and Wn, and ¯ qn enables each
node in Wm and Vn.
For each δ ∈[0,1] and sn ∈Qn, deﬁne:
11Ifonepicksadifferent ¯ sn todeﬁne ¯ qn thenoneobtainsanequivalentmixedstrategy, sinceallstrategies
inQn agree at nodes in W 0
n and, by Claim 1, exclude those in Wn \W 0
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• qn(sn,δ) is the mixed strategy that plays sn with probability 1 − δ and ¯ qn with
probability δ. The mixed strategy qn(sn,δ), like ¯ qn, is a mixture over strategies in
Qn.
LetQn(δ) be the collection of these mixed strategies.
• In case Rn is nonempty, rn(sn,δ) is the mixed strategy that plays sn with probabil-
ity 1−δ and ¯ rn with probability δ. Like ¯ rn, rn(sn,δ) assigns a positive probability
to some strategy in Rn. And since sn ∈ Qn, the conditional distribution over Rn
that is induced by rn(sn,δ) is the same as that induced by ¯ rn.
Let Rn(δ) be the collection of these mixed strategies.
In sum,
qn(sn,δ)=[1−δ]sn +δ¯ qn and rn(sn,δ)=[1−δ]sn +δ¯ rn
where the contingency table for the choices by ¯ qn and ¯ rn at nodes x ∈Xn is:
x ∈Vn x ∈Wn
¯ qn[x]= bn[x] ¯ sn[x]
¯ rn[x]= ¯ sn[x] bn[x]
Let G(δ) be the equivalent game obtained by adding for each player n all strategies in
Qn(δ) ∪ Rn(δ) as redundant pure strategies. Let S(δ) and Σ(δ) be the spaces of pure
and mixed strategy proﬁles for the game G(δ), and let In = |Sn(δ)|. If Rn is nonempty,
In =|Sn|+2×|Qn|; otherwise, In =2×|Sn|.
By assumption, for each δ there exists a proper equilibrium ˜ σ1(δ) of G(δ) whose
equivalent proﬁle in Σ, call it σ1(δ), is in Σ◦. By Blume et al. (1991b, Proposition 5)
there exists for each player n an LPS Kn(δ) ≡ (˜ σ1
n(δ),..., ˜ σ
In(δ)
n (δ)) over S(δ) with full
support, where In(δ) ¶ In, such that the LPS proﬁle (K1(δ),K2(δ)) respects preferences;
viz., if against Km(δ) a pure strategy sn for player n in G(δ) is a better reply than an-
other tn, then in Kn(δ), sn is inﬁnitely more likely than tn.12 (In particular, ˜ σ1
n(δ) is
a best reply against Km(δ).) Since In is independent of δ, by replacing Kn(δ) with






n (δ)) where we insert In − In(δ) copies
of ˜ σ1
n(δ) before ˜ σ2




n (δ)) be the corresponding LPS over Sn induced by Kn(δ); viz.,
σi
n(δ) is the strategy in Σn equivalent to ˜ σi
n(δ). Obviously for σn, σ0
n ∈Σn, σn is a better
reply against Km(δ) than σ0
n if and only if it is a better reply against Lm(δ) than σ0
n. In
particular, σ1
n(δ) is a best reply against Km(δ) and hence also against Lm(δ).
CLAIM 3. In Ln(δ) every strategy qn ∈ Qn is inﬁnitely more likely than every strategy
rn ∈Rn.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Fix a strategy qn ∈ Qn. Because σ1
m(δ) belongs to Σ◦, qn is a best
reply to σ1
m(δ). Let i be the ﬁrst level of Ln(δ) that assigns qn a positive probability.
12Recall from Section 4 that by a better reply we mean a lexicographically strict better reply.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Sufﬁcient conditions for stable equilibria 195
The ﬁrst level i0 of Kn(δ) that assigns a positive probability to qn is such that i0 ¾ i.
(It is possible that i0 > i, since a duplicate strategy qn(sn,δ) that has qn in its support
might be assigned a positive probability by level i of Kn(δ), thus accounting for the
presence of qn in the support of σi









0 the strategy proﬁle σ(δ,")=(σ1





n(δ). Because Γ is a generic extensive-form game, the outcome
induced by σ(δ,") is the same for all ", viz., they all induce P◦. Therefore, all strategies
in the support of σ
j
n(δ) for j ¶ i choose the unique equilibrium action at each node
x ∈ W 0
n . Thus these strategies are all in Qn, and those in Rn = Sn \Qn are only in the
supports of strategies in levels j >i of the LPS. 
Now choose a sequence δ(k) converging to zero as k increases and let (K1(δ(k)),
K2(δ(k))) and (L1(δ(k)),L2(δ(k))) be the corresponding sequences of LPS proﬁles,
where the former proﬁle respects preferences and (σ1
1(δ(k)),σ1
2(δ(k))) ∈ Σ◦. Passing to
a subsequence of the δ(k)’s if necessary, Blume et al. (1991b, Proposition 2) implies the











n (k)) ∈ (0,1)J i
n−1 converging
to zero such that, for each k, σi















Thus we obtain an LPS Ln = (σ
ij
n ), 1 ¶ i ¶ In, 1 ¶ j ¶ J i
n, where the ordering is the
following: ij < i0j 0 (that is, level ij is inﬁnitely more likely than level i0j 0) if i < i0 or
i =i0 and j < j 0.
The strategy proﬁle where each player n plays σ11
n , the ﬁrst level of his LPS, is in Σ◦
as it is the limit of the sequence of proﬁles where each player n plays σ1
n(δ(k)). Because
each level i of Ln(δ) is a nested combination of the LPS L i
n, a strategy σn is a better
reply against Lm than another strategy σ0
n if and only if for all large k it is a better reply
against Lm(δ(k)) than σ0
n is. In particular, strategies in the support of σ11
n , which are
obviously in the support of σ1
n(δ(k)) for all k, are best replies against Lm. Also, the
nested property for Ln along with Claim 3 immediately implies:
CLAIM 4. In Ln every strategy inQn is inﬁnitely more likely than every strategy in Rn.
In case Rn is nonempty, let i1
nj 1
n be the ﬁrst level of Ln that assigns a positive prob-









n . For each k, since each level i of Ln(δ(k)) is a nested combination of levels
of L i
n, i1












n (Rn) is limit of σ
i1
n
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Clearly, i1
n is the ﬁrst level of Kn(δ(k)) that assigns positive probability to a strategy
in either Rn or Rn(δ). (Recall that each strategy in Rn(δ) assigns a positive probability to
some strategy in Rn.) Let α1
nk (resp. β1
nk) be the sum of the probabilities of the strategies
in Rn(δ(k)) (resp. Rn) under ˜ σ
i1
n
n (δ(k)). Then α1(δ(k))+β1(δ(k))>0 since otherwise the
strategies in Rn would be assigned zero probability by σ
i1
n




n,s(δ(k)) of a strategy s ∈ Rn under σ
i1
n





Deﬁne a strategy σ∗
nk(Rn) ∈ Σn as follows. If β1
nk > 0, then let σ∗
nk(Rn) be the mixed
strategy in Σn that is obtained by taking the conditional distribution over Rn that is in-
duced by ˜ σ
i1
n
n (δ(k)): that is, the probabilities of strategies inQn under σ∗
nk(Rn) are zero,






nk = 0, let σ∗
nk(Rnk) be an
arbitrary mixed strategy in Σn whose support in contained in Rn. Let R∗
nk be the sup-
port of σ∗
nk(Rn). By construction, R∗
nk is contained in Rn, and in case β1
nk 6= 0 it equals
the set of strategies that are assigned a positive probability by level i1





nk]. We now have that σ
i1
n
n (δ(k),Rn) is given by the condi-




By going to an appropriate subsequence of δ(k), µ∗
nk converges to some µ∗
n and
σ∗
n(Rn) converges to some strategy σ∗
n(Rn) with support, say, R∗
n. Because the support
of σ∗




n (Rn) is now the conditional distribution




Say that a pure strategy sn of player n is conditionally optimal against Lm if at every
node x ∈Xn that sn does not exclude the action prescribed by sn at x is optimal against
the ﬁrst level of Lm that does not exclude x.
CLAIM 5. Suppose Rn is nonempty. (1) If µ∗
n 6=1 then every strategy in R∗
n is conditionally
optimal against Lm. (2) µ∗
n 6=0.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose µ∗
n 6= 1. Fix a pure strategy rn ∈ Rn that is not conditionally
optimal against Lm. We show that rn / ∈ R∗
n. The set R∗
n is the support of σ∗
n(Rn), which
is deﬁned as the limit of σ∗
nk(Rn). Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to show that rn does not
belong to the support R∗
nk of σ∗
n(Rn) for all large k. Since µ∗
n 6= 1, β1
nk 6= 0 for all large k.
As remarked above, this implies that for each such k, R∗
nk is the set of strategies that are
assignedapositiveprobabilitybyleveli1
n ofKn(δ(k)). Toshowthatforlargek,rn / ∈R∗
nk,
i.e. that it is assigned probability zero by ˜ σ
i1
n
n (δ(k)), it is sufﬁcient to show that for large
enough k there is a strategy r0
n ∈ Rn ∪Rn(δ(k)) that is a better reply against Lm(δ(k)).
Indeed, the result then follows from the fact that Kn(δ(k)) respects preferences and that
i1
n is the ﬁrst level of Kn(δ(k)) that assigns positive probability to some strategy in Rn ∪
Rn(δ(k)).
Letx be a node of player n that rn does not exclude and where it is not conditionally
optimal. Consider ﬁrst the case P◦(x)>0. Then σ11
m is the ﬁrst level of Lm that does not
exclude x. It cannot be the case that rn chooses the equilibrium action at x since that
choice is optimal. Thus rn chooses a non-equilibrium action at x that is not optimal
against σ11
m at x. Pick sn ∈Qn that is in the support of σ11
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against Lm, while rn is not even a best reply against σ11
m. Therefore, there exists δ0 > 0
such that rn(sn,δ0) is a better reply against Lm than rn. Hence, there exists k0 such
that rn(sn,δ0) is a better reply against Lm(δ(k)) for k ¾ k0. Because sn is a best reply
against Lm, there exists k1 ¾k0 such that sn is a best reply against Lm(δ(k)) for k ¾k1.
Consequently,foreachδ <δ0,andk ¾k1,rn(sn,δ),whichisaconvexcombinationofsn
and rn(sn,δ0), is a weakly better reply against Lm(δ(k)) than rn(sn,δ0). In particular, for
k such that k ¾ k1 and δ(k) < δ0, rn(sn,δ(k)) is a weakly better reply against Lm(δ(k))
than rn(sn,δ0) and therefore a better reply than rn. Thus rn / ∈R∗
nk for large k.
Now suppose P◦(x) = 0. Let r0
n be a strategy that differs from rn only in that it pre-
scribes an optimal continuation at x. Obviously r0
n is in Rn as well. Moreover, against
Lm it is now a better reply than rn. Hence for all large k, r0
n is a better reply against
Lm(δ(k)) than rn. Again rn is not in R∗
nk for large k.
To ﬁnish the proof of the claim, it remains to show that µ∗
n > 0. Suppose to the
contrary that µ∗




n (Rn) = σ∗
n(Rn) and thus by (1) all strategies that belong




n are optimal against σ11




toQn and is also optimal against σ11
m. Also, σ11
m is a best reply to Ln. Hence, for all small
", the strategy proﬁle (σ11
















n +j. The strategy σn(") assigns positive probability to strategies in
Rn, which by deﬁnition choose a non-equilibrium action at some node on the equilib-
rium path that they do not exclude. Hence for " > 0, (σ11
m,σn(")) induces an outcome
different from P◦, which is impossible. Therefore, µ∗
n >0. 
CLAIM 6. For x ∈Vn, the ﬁrst level of Lm(δ) that enables it is i1
mj 1











PROOF OF CLAIM. By Claim 1, any strategy of m that enables x belongs to Rm—in par-
ticular, Rm is nonempty and i1
mj 1
m is well deﬁned. By the deﬁnition of i1
mj 1
m, therefore,
x is not enabled by ij <i1
mj 1















This last point follows from Claim 2 and point (2) of Claim 5. 
Let Q+
n be the subset of strategies in Qn that are conditionally optimal against Lm.
Let i0
nj 0
n be the ﬁrst level ij with the following property: ifQn =Q+
n, then every strategy
inQn is assigned a positive probability by some level i0j 0 ¶ij; and ifQn 6=Q+
n, then level
ij assigns a positive probability to some s ∈Qn \Q+





by Claim 4. Moreover, ifQn 6=Q+
n, i0
nj 0
n > 11: σ11
n assigns probability only to best replies
against Lm, and any strategy inQn \Q+
n is obviously not a best reply against Lm.198 Govindan and Wilson Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
CLAIM 7. Suppose Qn 6= Q+
n. Then ¯ qn assigns positive probability to some strategy in
Qn \Q+
n.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Let sn ∈Qn \Q+
n. Let x ∈Xn be a node that sn enables but where it is
not conditionally optimal. Obviously P◦(x)=0, since sn prescribes only the equilibrium
actionatnodesontheequilibriumpath. ByClaim1,wethereforehavex ∈Vn. Theresult
now follows from the fact that ¯ qn enables each node in Vn (Claim 2) and is equivalent to
a behavioral strategy that mixes over all the actions at each such node. 
Suppose Qn 6=Q+
n. Let Q0
n be the set of qn ∈Qn assigned zero probability by levels
ij <i0
nj 0
n. By deﬁnition there exists qn that belongs toQ0
n \Q+
n and that is assigned pos-






n induces a well-deﬁned conditional dis-
tribution overQ0





n). To compute this conditional distribution, we mimic
what we did for Rn above. (The only difference between what we present in the next
paragraph and their counterparts from before is that we use Q0
n instead of Rn and ¯ qn
instead of ¯ rn.)
For each k, level i0






n) be the conditional distribution overQ0




n (δ(k)). Using the above claim, i0




and a mixed strategy σ∗
nk(Q0
n) with support, say,Q∗
nk ⊆Q0










nk ¯ qn. If λ∗
nk 6= 1 then
Q∗
nk consists of strategies sn ∈Q0




n . Going to the












n the support of σ∗
n(Q0
n).
We want to establish an analogue of the optimality property of R∗
n in Claim 5 forQ∗
n.
Before doing so, we need a preliminary claim.
CLAIM 8. All strategies in Qn are equally good replies against any strategy for player m
whose support is contained inQm.
PROOF OF CLAIM. The result follows from the following three observations. All strate-
gies inQn agree at each x ∈ W 0
n ; they exclude nodes in Wn \W 0
n , by point 2 of Claim 1;
ﬁnally a node x ∈Vn is excluded by every strategy inQm by point 1 of Claim 1. 
CLAIM 9. Suppose Qn 6= Q+
n. (1) If λ∗
n 6= 1, each strategy in Q∗
n is conditionally optimal
against Lm, i.e. it belongs toQ+
n. (2) λ∗
n 6=0.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Supposeqn ∈Qn\Q+
n. Weshowthatqn / ∈Q∗
n. Asintheproofofstate-
ment (1) of Claim 5, it sufﬁcient to show thatqn / ∈Q∗




n (δ(k)), for large k. We claim that we are done if we can show that there exists
sn ∈Qn such that qn(sn,δ(k)) is a better reply against Km(δ(k)) for large k. Indeed, ifTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Sufﬁcient conditions for stable equilibria 199
there does exist such an sn, then letting i(k) and i(qn,k) be, resp., the ﬁrst levels where
qn(sn,δ(k))andqn areassignedpositiveprobabilitybyKn(δ(k)),wehavei(k)<i(qn,k)
forlargek, becauseKn(δ(k))respectspreferences. ByClaim7, leveli(k)ofLn(δ(k))as-
signs a positive probability to some some q0
n ∈Qn \Q+
n. Hence, i0
n ¶ i(k) < i(qn,δ(k))
and qn is assigned zero probability by ˜ σ
i0
n
n . Thus, it is sufﬁcient to show the existence of
sn ∈Qn such that qn(sn,δ(k)) is a better reply against Km(δ(k)) for large k.
Sinceqn is not conditionally optimal against Lm, there exists x ∈Xn thatqn enables
and where it is not optimal against the ﬁrst level of Lm that enables it. Clearly, x / ∈ W 0
n ,
since qn chooses the equilibrium action at each node on the equilibrium path. As qn
excludes each node in Wn \ W 0




n be a strategy that agrees with qn everywhere except that in the subgame at x, it




m . Obviously, q0
n belongs
to Qn and is a better reply to level i1
mj 1
m of Lm than qn. Pick sn in the support of σ11
n .
Because sn ∈ Qn, sn and q0
n are equally good replies against every level ij < i1
mj 1
m of








m than qn. There exists δ0 > 0




m than qn. Since the support of qn(sn,δ0)
is contained in Qn, again using Claim 8, qn(sn,δ0) is a better reply to Lm(δ) than qn.
Hence there exists k0 such that for all k ¾ k0, qn(sn,δ0) is a better reply to Lm(δ(k))
than qn. Because σn is a best reply to Lm, there exists k1 > k0 such that sn is a weakly
better reply to Lm(δ(k) thanqn(sn,δ0) for all k ¾k1. Hence for all k such that δ(k)¶δ0
and k ¾k1,qn(sn,δ(k)) is a better reply to Lk(δ(k)) thanqn, which completes the proof
of (1).
We now prove point (2). Suppose λ∗








n assigns positive probability to some strategy in
Q0
n \Q+
n, it must be that λ∗
n 6=0. 
CLAIM 10. Let x ∈ Wn. Then x is enabled by σ
ij
m for some ij ¶ i0
mj 0
m. Moreover, ifQm 6=
Q+
m and x is not enabled by level ij < i0
mj 0










PROOF OF CLAIM. By Claim 1, there is a strategy sm in Qm that enables x. Suppose
Qm =Q+
m. By the deﬁnition of i0
mj 0
m, sm is assigned positive probability by some level
ij ¶i0
mj 0
m of Lm, which then enables x.
Suppose now that Qm 6= Q+
m and x is not enabled by any level ij < i0
mj 0
m. Then
by the deﬁnition of Q0








m induced by level i0
mj 0
m is that induced by
λ∗
m ¯ qm + (1 − λ∗
m)σ∗
m(Q0
m). Thus, to complete the proof it is sufﬁcient to show that
λ∗
m ¯ qm + (1 − λ∗
m)σ∗
m(Q0
m) enables x. This last follows from point (2) of Claim 9 and
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CLAIM 11. For each n there exist ν∗
n ∈ (0,1] and σ∗
n ∈ Σn such that we have the following




(1) If νn 6=1 then σ∗
n is conditionally optimal against Lm.





n then for each x ∈Wm that is not enabled by ij <i0
nj 0
n, σn enables x and
prescribes the same continuation strategy in Γ(x) as level i0
nj 0
n.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose ﬁrst thatQn =Q+
n and Rn is empty, then let σn = τn. (We
have ν∗
n = 1 and the choice of σ∗
n is irrelevant.) Points (1) and (3) of the claim hold
trivially. As for point (2), if Rn is empty, Vm is empty, by Claim 1, and hence it too holds
trivially.
Suppose now thatQn =Q+






point (2) of this claim, remark ﬁrst that by Claim 6, the continuation strategy for player




n is that given by (1−µ∗
n)σ∗
n(Rn)+µ∗
n ¯ rn. Since x ∈ Vm,
by Claim 1, every node of n that precedes or succeeds x belongs to Wn. The strategies
¯ rn and τn are equivalent to behavioral strategies that choose the same mixture at each





Finally, suppose now that Qn 6= Q+
n. Let V 0
n be the set of initial vertices of Vn, viz.,
V 0
n is the set of nodes in Vn that are not preceded by any other vertex in Vn. By the
deﬁnition of V 0
n and Claim 1, nodes in Xn that precede a node in V 0
n belong to W 0
n . Also,
V 0
n is nonempty. Indeed, if it is empty then Vn is empty; but then Qn = Q+
n because
all strategies inQn prescribe the equilibrium action at each node in W 0
n and exclude all
nodesinWn\W 0
n . Thus,V 0
n isnonempty. Forv ∈V 0
n ,deﬁneν∗
nv tobetheprobabilitythat
τn enables v, i.e. ν∗
nv is the total probability under τn of the set of pure strategies that
enable v. For each v ∈ V 0
n , deﬁne σ∗
nv to be the mixed strategy that is equivalent to the
following behavioral strategy: in the subgame Γ(v) play according to σ∗
n(Qn); elsewhere
play according to σ11
n . The strategy σ∗
nv is a mixture over strategies inQn and if λ∗
n 6= 1
then σ∗
nv is conditionally optimal against Lm, since strategies σ∗
n(Qn) and σ11
n are.
In case Rn is empty, deﬁne ˆ σn to be σ11
n and let ˆ µ∗
n = 1. In case Rn is nonempty,
let ˆ µ∗
n = µ∗
n and deﬁne ˆ σ∗
n to be the mixed strategy that is equivalent to the following
behavioral strategy: at each node x ∈Wn, play according to σ∗
n(Rn); at each node x ∈Vn,
play according to σ11
n . Obviously, when ˆ µ∗












































By point (2) of Claims 5 and 9, λ∗
n 6= 0 6= ˆ µ∗
n. Thus, σn is a well deﬁned strategy and
0<ν∗

































n 6=1. Then either λ∗
n 6=1 or ˆ µ∗
n 6=1. If λ∗
n 6=1 then each σ∗
nv is optimal against Lm. And
if ˆ µ∗
n 6= 1 then ˆ σn is optimal against Lm. Therefore, if ν∗
n 6= 1 then σ∗
n is optimal against
Lm. To prove point (2) we argue as follows. Suppose x ∈ Vn. By Claim 1, x is enabled
only by strategies in Rn. (In particular if Rn is nonempty, ˆ σn = σ∗
n(Rn) and ˆ µ∗
n = µ∗
n.)
The only “components” of σn that enable x are τn and ˆ σn. Therefore, the continuation
strategy in Γ(x) under σn is that given (1− ˆ µ∗
n)ˆ σn + ˆ µ∗
nτn. As before, any node of n that
precedesorsucceedsx belongstoWm. Thestrategy ˆ σn agreeswithσ∗
n(Rn)ateachnode
in Wn while τn agrees with ¯ rn at each such node. Thus the continuation strategy in Γ(x)
that is induced by σn is the same as that given by (1−µ∗
n)σ∗
n(Rn)+µ∗
n ¯ rn. The result now
follows from Claim 6.
It remains to prove point (3). Let x ∈ Wm be a node such that the ﬁrst level of Ln





n > 11. There must exist v ∈ V 0
n that precedes
it: otherwise, by Claim 1, the only nodes preceding x belong to W 0
n and x is enabled by
σ11
n . By construction, the strategies σ∗
nv0 for v0 6=v and ˆ σ∗
n(Rn) choose the continuation
strategy prescribed by σ11
n in the subgame Γ(v). Because σ11
n does not enable x, clearly
these strategies do not either. Therefore, the only “components” of σn that enable x are
σ∗
nv and τn. Thus, the continuation action prescribed by σn in Γ(x) is that prescribed













where the factor ˆ µ∗
n cancels out. In the subgame Γ(v), qn prescribes the same continu-
ation as τn while σ∗
nv prescribes the same continuation as σ∗
n(Q0





nv. Hence it is clear that σn prescribes the same continuation strategy in Γ(v)—and,




(3) follows by applying Claim 10. 
We construct a new LPS L n as follows. Suppose ﬁrst that Qn = Q+
n. The LPS L n
is obtained by deleting all levels succeeding i0
nj 0
n and adding the mixed strategy σn de-
ﬁned above as the last level. IfQn 6=Q+
n then i0
nj 0
n > 11 so L n has more than one level.
Delete all levels succeeding i0
nj 0
n and replace level i0
nj 0
n with a mixed strategy σn as de-
ﬁned above.
To ﬁnish the proof of the proposition it remains to show that every strategy in the
support of σ∗
n (as deﬁned in Claim 11) or of a level of L n before the last is condition-
ally optimal against L n. Point (1) of Claim 11 in conjunction with the following claim
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CLAIM 12. A strategy of player n is conditionally optimal against L m if and only if it is
conditionally optimal against Lm.
PROOF OF CLAIM. We show the following. For each node x ∈ Xn the ﬁrst level of L m
that does not exclude x induces the same continuation strategy for m in Γ(x) as the ﬁrst
level of Lm that does not exclude x.
If x ∈ W 0
n then the ﬁrst level of Lm enables it and coincides with the ﬁrst level of
L m. If x ∈Vn then by Claim 6 the ﬁrst level of Lm that enables it is i1
mj 1
m and the result
follows in this case by point (2) of the previous claim. If x ∈Wn \W 0
n then, by Claim 10, x
is enabled by some level ij ¶i0
mj 0
m of Lm. If ij <i0
mj 0
m or ifQm =Q+
m then x is enabled
by the same level of L m as that of Lm. Finally, if Qm 6= Q+
m and x is enabled only by
level i0
mj 0
m of Lm then the result follows from point (3) of the previous claim. 
C. SIGNALING GAMES
This appendix provides a simple proof of a variant of Theorem 1 for two-player two-
stage signaling games of the kind depicted in Figure 3 in Section 2.1. For these games,
the strategic-form and extensive-form perfect equilibria coincide, and if payoffs are
generic then they are the same as the sequential equilibria and all equilibria in each
component yield the same outcome.
The extensive form is described by three nonempty ﬁnite sets (T,M,A) and the sce-
nario in which player 1 (the sender) observes some type t ∈T and then sends a message
m ∈ M; next, player 2 (the responder) observes only the message m that was sent and
based on this observation chooses an action a ∈ A. The set of pure strategies for the
sender is S = MT, and for the responder, R = AM. A particular game G is obtained
by specifying the players’ payoffs and nature’s probabilities: let the payoff to player n be
un(t,m,a)andletπt >0bethepriorprobabilityoftypet. Agenericsignalinggamehas
ﬁnitely many Nash equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, in each component of equilibria,
the sender has a unique equilibrium strategy and the indeterminacy in equilibria arises
only from multiple actions for the receiver following out-of-equilibrium messages from
the sender. Cho and Kreps (1987) cite and Banks and Sobel (1987, Theorem 3) prove the
following characterization.13
PROPOSITION 4 (Cho and Kreps, Banks and Sobel). Foragenericclassofsignalinggames,
an equilibrium component is stable if and only if for each unsent message m and each
probability distribution θ ∈ ∆(T) there exists in the component a sequential equilibrium
sustained by the sender’s belief µ ∈ ∆(T)M such that µ(·|m) is in the convex hull of θ
and ∆(Tm), where Tm is the subset of types (if any) indifferent between sending m and
using an equilibrium strategy. [That is, Tm = {t |
P
a∈A u1(t,m,a)γ(a|m) = u ◦
1(t)} where
u ◦
1(t) is the equilibrium conditional expected payoff of the sender given her type t and the
responder’s strategy γ.]
13This proposition can be proved also using the characterization result in Theorem 2.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Sufﬁcient conditions for stable equilibria 203
Such a sequential equilibrium satisﬁes the sufﬁcient condition for stability in The-
orem 1 even if it is not induced by a proper equilibrium. The following shows that this
anomaly disappears when Invariance is invoked.
PROPOSITION 5. Fix an equilibrium component Σ◦ of a generic signaling game. If there
exists an unsent message m and a probability distribution θ ∈ ∆(T) for which the condi-
tion in Proposition 4 is violated then there exists an equivalent game, obtained by adding
asinglemixedstrategyoftheoriginalgameasanadditionalpurestrategy,withnoproper
equilibrium that is equivalent to some equilibrium in Σ◦.
PROOF. Fix a message m that is an out-of-equilibrium message in the component Σ◦.
Pick θ ∈∆(T). Choose a pure strategy s ∈MT in the support of the sender’s equilibrium
strategy in Σ◦. For each type t let stm be the pure strategy that agrees with s except that
stm(t) = m—in stm type t sends the message m while all other types send the message
prescribed by s, which is different from m, since m is an out-of-equilibrium message.
Let ˆ σ(δ) be the mixed strategy that assigns probability 1−δ to s and probability δηtm
to stm, where 0 < δ < 1 and ηtm = [θt/πt]/
P
t∈T[θt/πt]. Thus, δ is the probability of
a tremble in favor of m that with probability ηtm deviates in the event t from s(t) to
m. Observe that conditional on the strategy ˆ σ(δ) and a tremble in favor of the unsent
message m, the posterior probability that the message m came from type t is




Consequently, µ(t|m, ˆ σ(δ))=θt. Now append ˆ σ(δ) as a new pure strategy in the strate-
gicform. Thisexpandedgamehasthesamereducedstrategicformastheoriginalgame.
Assume now that for every small δ > 0, there is a proper equilibrium of the expanded
game that induces the same outcome. We show that (m,θ) must satisfy the condition in
Proposition 4.
Fix δ and let (σδ,ρδ) be a proper equilibrium whose reduced form belongs to Σ◦.
By deﬁnition, there exists a sequence (σδ,",ρδ,") of "-proper equilibria converging to
(σδ,ρδ). Let µδ,"(·|m) be the induced sequence of posteriors on the types conditional
on m, and let γδ," ∈ ∆(A) be the induced mixed action of the responder after receiving
message m. Let µδ and γδ be the corresponding limits. Let u ◦
1(t) be the equilibrium
payoff to type t of the sender in the component Σ◦. Deﬁne f δ(t) =
P
t 06=t πt 0u ◦
1(t 0) +
πtu1(t,m,γδ), which is the expected payoff to the sender when type t deviates by send-
ingm andtheresponderreplieswiththebehavioralstrategyγδ. LetT δ =argmaxt f δ(t),
the set of those types with the smallest disincentive to sending m when the responder
uses γδ.
We claim that µδ belongs to the convex hull of θ and ∆(T δ). To see this, consider
any pure strategy s0 of the original game that sends message m for a subset T 0 " T δ of
types. Fix some t 0 ∈ T 0 \T δ. The strategy s0 does no better against ρδ than the strategy
st 0m. (Recall that the strategy st 0m is one in which type t 0 sends message m while all
other types send the message prescribed by strategy s, which is in the support of the
sender’s equilibrium strategy in Σ◦.) For t ∗ ∈ T δ, f (t ∗) > f (t 0), since t 0 / ∈ T δ. Therefore,204 Govindan and Wilson Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
thestrategyst ∗m doesstrictlybetterthanst 0m (ands0)againstρδ andhenceagainstρδ,"
for all small ". Consequently, the limit belief µδ is not determined by any pure strategy
of the original game where a type not in T δ sends m. In other words, µδ is determined
by the relative probabilities of ˆ σ(δ) and those pure strategies for which only types in T δ
send message m. Hence, µδ belongs to the convex hull of θ and ∆(T δ) as asserted.
LetS(δ) be the set of stm such that t ∈T δ. Observe that by deﬁnition all strategies in
S(δ) yield the same payoff against ρδ. Now suppose for some δ that the new pure strat-
egy ˆ σ(δ) does strictly better than the pure strategies in S(δ) against ρδ. Then we claim
that the limit belief is θ and the condition in Proposition 4 holds. By the conclusion
from the last paragraph, to prove this claim it is sufﬁcient to show that for any strategy
s0 where a nonempty subset ˆ T δ of T δ of types send message m, ˆ σ(δ) is a better reply
against ρδ than s0. To prove this last point, consider such a pure strategy s0: the pure
strategy stm, where t ∈ ˆ T δ, is at least as good a reply as s0 against ρδ; in turn stm does
strictlyworsethan ˆ σ(δ)asitbelongstoS(δ). Thusµδ equalsθ if ˆ σ(δ)doesstrictlybetter
than the pure strategies inS(δ).
Finally, if for each δ sufﬁciently small the strategies inS(δ) do at least as well as ˆ σ(δ)
then their payoffs against ρδ must be arbitrarily close to
P
t πtu ◦
1(t), since the payoff to
ˆ σ(δ) is at least (1−δ)
P
t u ◦
1(t)−δK for a positive constant K. Consider now a sequence
of δ’s going to zero such that T δ is constant, call it T ∗, and (µδ,γδ) converges to, say,
(µ∗,γ∗). Then µ∗ belongs to the convex hull of θ and ∆(T ∗). Moreover, for each type
t ∈T ∗, u1(t,m,γ∗)=u ◦
1(t). Thus again the condition in Proposition 4 holds. 
For instance, the result of applying the Intuitive Criterion to the examples in Figures
2 and 3 in Section 2.1 can be obtained by invoking stability, or simply by observing that
the preferred component is the one containing a proper equilibrium.
Cho and Kreps (1987, p. 220) conclude that, “if there is an intuitive story to go with
the full strength of stability, it is beyond our powers to offer it here.” Proposition 5 shows
that if one recognizes that “the full strength of stability” entails Invariance, and that a
properequilibriuminducesasequentialequilibriumineveryextensive-formgamewith
the same strategic form, then the “intuitive story” is less mysterious.
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